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V 
JURiSDICTIONAL STATEMENT · 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah"Code section 78A-4-103(2)(h) which 
grants the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over appeals involving child custody and 
support. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This · appeal relates to the failure of an appellant to preserve issues before the trial 
court, and whether the trial court should have exercised child custody jurisdiction despite 
preexisting orders and ongoing custody litigation in Mexico with respect to those same 
children. 
Issue 1: Whether both the domestic comm1ss10ner and district court judge 
improperly determined that Utah lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), Utah Code section 78B-13-101 et seq 
when Mexico already had issued multiple custody orders and there was ongoing litigation 
there: 
Standard of Review: "[J]urisdictional questions and questions of statutory 
interpretation are questions of law that we review for correctness." In re Z.Z., 2013 UT 
App 215,, 8,310 P.3d 772,775 (citation omitted). 
Preservation: Appellee Juan Pablo Matas-Vidal ("Father") does not dispute that 
· this first issue was preserved below. 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in not convening an evidentiary hearing or 
communicating with Mexican courts before considering Father's motion to dismiss and 
determining that preexisting custody orders in Mexico preempted jurisdiction in Utah, 
1 
and that unjustifiable misc;:onduct :by. Appellant Brool<:~ Robinson a/k/a. Susan Consuelo 
Libb~y-Aguilera ("Mother") served a_s an alternate basis to deny jurisdiction. 
· Standard of Review: In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) trial courts may rely on 
affidavits and other "materials outside the pleadings." Sf!e, e.g., Myers v. Utah Transit 
Auth., 2014 UT App 294, ,r 13 n.2, 341 P.3d 935, 939 n.2. No law compels a Utah court 
to hold an evidentiary hearing or confer with outside judicial authorities when 
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(l). 
Preservation: Mother failed to preserve this issue below. Utah law provides that 
to preserve an issue for appellate review, "the issue must have been raised in a timely 
fashion." State v. Gailey, 2015 UT App 249, ,r 5,360 P.3d 805, 807. 
In response to Father's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
Mother did not request that the domestic commissioner conduct an evidentiary hearing or 
contact Mexican judicial authorities. When Mother objected to the domestic 
commissioner's recommendation under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 108, Mother again 
did not ask for an evidentiary hearing nor ask for the Utah judge to speak· with the 
Mexican judge. Only after the trial court overruled· the objection and affirmed the 
domestic commissioner's recommendation, Mother filed a motion under _Utah Rules of 
. 
Civil Procedure 52 and 59, where for the first time - nine months after the motion to 
dismiss was first filed - she obliquely complained that the trial court had not convened an 
evidentiary hearing nor engaged in a dialogue with a Mexican judge. That was far too 
untimely to preserve the issue below. 
2 
' 
Issue 3: Whether the district court's findings of fact and conclusions ofJaw were 
insufficiently detailed to .support its rationale for determining that Utah lacked 
jurisdiction because of the preexisting custody orders in Mexico, the · simultaneous 
custody proceedings in Mexico, and Mother's unjustifiable misconduct. 
Standard of Review: "A trial court's findings 'should be sufficiently detailed and 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached.' Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
When a trial court fails to make findings on a material issue, we assume the court 'found 
them in accord with its decision, and we affirm the decision if from the evidence it would 
be reasonable to find facts to support it.' State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) 
( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But we will vacate for further findings 
when 'the ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption unreasonable.' Id. at 788." 
Widdison v. Widdison, 2014 UT App 233; , 6, 336 P.3d 1106, 1108. "Because a finding 
of fact need only be supported by sufficient subsidiary facts to justify it, one erroneous 
subsidiary finding does not necessarily render the ultimate factual finding erroneous as 
well." Parduhn v: Bennett, 2005 UT 22, ,·24, 112 P.3d 495, 502. "[T]his court upholds 
the trial court even if it failed to make findings · on the record whenever it would be 
reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings." Ramirez; 817 P.2d at 
787 n.6. 
Preservation: Mother did not preserve this issue below. Before the trial court, 
Mother argued the underlying issues doggedly, but never challenged the sufficiency of 
the trial court's written findings. Even when Mother filed an objection to the fomi of 
3 
order stemming from the domestic commissioner's recommended order, Mother's 
objection simply re-argued the merits of the matter rather than challenge the detail or 
adequacy of the· factual findings. (R.511-45.) · "[A] party 'waive[s] any argument 
regarding whether the district court's findings of fact were sufficiently detailed' when the 
[party] fails to challenge the detail, or adequacy, of the findings with the district court."' 
Sellers v. Sellers, 2010 UT App 393, ,i 4, 246 P.3d 173, 175 (quoting In re K.F., 2009 UT 
4, ,i 60, 201 P.3d 985 (internal citation omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following determinative and statutory provisions are included in Addenda A 
through G hereto: relevant portions of the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act, to wit, Utah Code sections 78B-13-102, -201, -202, -203, -206, -208, 
and-209. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case relates to a petition for child custody and support filed by Mother in 
' 2013, more than six years after the partiesfirst commenced their divorce in Mexico and 
where the Mexican court system (both its family law and criminal courts) had issued 
multiple orders regarding both custody and support. Because Mexico's courts already had 
exercised jurisdiction over these issues, Father filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, which the trial court properly granted. As an independent and 
alternative basis, -the trial court also declined to exercise jurisdiction based on Mother's 
unjustifiable misconduct, to wit, kidnapping the children from Mexico, hiding them in 
4 
' 
Utah, changing• their names, and doing everything she could to deprive· them of their 
father. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
Father initially filed for divorce in Mexico City in 2007. (R.275, 521.) The 
Mexican court system issued multiple orders in the parties' divorce since then; those 
orders are discussed in greater detail below. 
Mother illegally secreted the children to Utah in December 2010. (R.28, 90, 114, 
365, 554, 1153.) 
In defiance of the Mexican legal _system, Mother commenced the instant action for 
custody and child support on November 18, 2013 by filing the Verified Petition to 
Establish Custody of Minor Children, Payment of Child Support and Alimony, Entry of 
Restraining Order, and/or Attorney Fees. (R.1-8.) 
On May 13, 2014, Mother served the petition upon Father. (R.97, 562, 1162.) 
On June 12, 2014, Father filed the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. 
(R.562, 1162.) 
On October 20, 2014, the domestic commissioner held a hearing on the motio~ to 
dismiss, and recommended granting the same. (R.377, 500-10, 853-61, 931-34.) 
'On November 3, 2014, Mother filed an· objection to the commissioner's 
recominendation under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 108. (R.381-470.) Father opposed 
the objection. 
5 
On Nqvember 17, 2014, Mother filed an objection to the form of order prepared 
by Father's counsel stemming from the domestic commissioner's oral recommendation. 
(R.511-45.) Father opposed this objection as welt 
On March 5, 2015, the district court convened a hearing to receive oral argument 
respecting Mother's objections. The trial court overruled Mother's objections and entered 
a written order dated March 17, 2015, dismissing the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. (R.920.) 
On March 31, 2015, Mother filed a motion to _amend the dismissal under Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 52-and 59. (R.937-1002.) Father opposed the motion. Mother 
did not file a reply brief in support of the Rule 52/59 motion nor request oral argument. 
(R.1147-29, 1233-35.) 
On April 30, 2015, the district court issued a written order denying Mother's 
motion to amend the order of dismissal. (R.1238-40.) On May 21, 2015, Mother filed the 
notice of appeal. (R.1241-42.) 
The trial court correctly determined that Utah lacks subject matter jurisdiction 
over Mother's petition because Mexico already issued child custody and support orders 
,\ 
a:fid ongoing litigation was continuing in Mexico. (R.377, 853-61, 931-34.) As a separate 
and independent basis, the trial court also appropriately declined to exercise jurisdiction 
based on Mother's unjustifiable misconduct, i.e., international parental kidnapping and 
cruelly hiding the children from their father. (R.377, 853-61, 931-34.) 
6 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
· Appellant Brooke Robinson, formerly known as 'susan ·consuelo Libbey-Aguilera, 
· ("Mother") and Appellee Juan Pablo Matas-Vidal ("Father") were married in Mexico City 
in 1999, where they resided throughout their marriage. (R.l, 25, 88, 113, 274, 364, 387, 
5 51, 1149.) 1 They are the parents of two minor children, namely SM-L, born May 2001 
in Mexico City, and RM-L, born November 2003 in Mexico City. (R.2, 19, 88, 113, 273-
4, 475.) Mother is a dual Mexican/American citizen, while Father is a citizen of Mexico. 
(R.1, 25, 88, 113,274,387,521, 551, 946, 1149.) 
In September 2007, Father expressed a desire to divorce. (R.26, 89, 113, 551, 
1150.) In response, Mother fled to Texas, taking the children without notifying Father. 
(R.26, 89, 113, 148, 1150.) Upon Mother's return to Mexico City in October 2007, Father 
served her with divorce papers filed in the Superior Court of Justice for the Federal 
1 Below, the domestic commissioner and district court took judicial notice, admitted into 
the record, and relied upon the findings, conclusions, and orders from various custody 
and other relevant proceedings in which the parties had previously engaged. One such 
proceeding was the case in the Federal District Court for the District of Utah on Father's 
Petition for Immediate Return. of Children Pursuant to the Hague Convention and the 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act. In resolution ~ereof, the federal court made 
extensive and detailed findings of fact in Matas-Vidal v. Libbey-Aguilera, No. 
2:13CV422DAK, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 110630 (D. Utah Aug. 5, 2013) (unpublished). 
While the available remedies in the federal proceedings pursuant to the Hague 
Convention are different than those at issue here, the federal court's factual findings were 
the result of full and fair litigation, thereby precluding a re-examination or re-weighing of 
those same factual issues under the doctrine of res judicata. These fully-litigated factual 
findings provided the domestic commissioner and district court a robust factual 
background of undisputed facts for the application and analysis of child custody 
jurisdiction under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 
UTAH CODE §§ 78B-13-101 et. seq. Father's record citations largely reference these 
previously litigated and judicially-noticed factual findings, as adopted and contained in 
the record before the domestic commissioner and district court. 
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District, 36th Court of Domestic Affairs ("36th Family Court!') in case number 
-1472/2007. (R.26, 89, 97, 1.13, 275,387,521, 551, 947.) On October 16, 2007, the 36th 
Family Court issued an emergency order barring , Mother from again removing the 
children from Mexico. (R.26, 89, 113, 148, 158, 160, 175, 365.) On December 14, 2007, 
the 36th Family Court entered a_more comprehensive temporary order that Mother would 
reside in the marital residence with the children during the pendency of the divorce, and 
Father would have overnight visitation with the children every other weekend and half of 
all school holidays and vacations. (R.26, 89, 113, 126, 158, 167, 197, 234.) The 
temporary order again prohibited Mother from removing the . children frolll Mexico. 
Despite the December 14, 2007 temporary order, Mother consistently obstructed Father's 
contact and prevented his visitation with the children.2 (R.27, 89, 114, 149, 160, 197, 
240-41, 251, 305, 552.) 
In 2008, an initial court-ordered custody evaluation was completed. The 
evaluation found that Mother had instilled in the children a sense of unfounded dread of 
2 Mother also has attempted to assert that Father's parent-time was supervised --as we 
understand that term and its implications in the U.S .. This reflects a lack of.candor and 
cultural understanding. Supervised Family Interactions Centers, as referenced by the 
federal court in the related Hague SP proceedings, are commonplace to assist and 
facilitate parent-time when custody proceedings are pending in the Mexican legal system. 
They are commonly used to document parent-time exchanges and assure that such parent-
time occurs, where it has been otherwise difficult to . secure. That ·was the purpose of 
using the Supervised Family Interaction Center in this case. Contrary· to Mother's 
suggestion, use of such services was not a result of any allegations of abuse, as those did 
not arise until much later when the divorce and custody case became much more 
contentious. (R.29-30, 37-38, 115, 118, 295, 367-68, 388, 483-90, 549-52, 821-22.) 
( outlining the fact that Mother disclaimed. any abuse and did not raise such claims until 
well into the divorce when the psychological reports unfavorable to her were filed). 
8 
their Father, and that such feelings were "more consistent --· with induction and 
manipulation attitudes in them than the result of their own experiences and that it is 
inferred that they have been mostly induced or manipulated by their mother." (R.29, 89, 
91, 115, 118, 365-66, 552, 555.) Mother disputed the findings of the custody evaluation, 
and the 36th Family · Court ordered that the court appointed psychologist conduct a 
supplemental update. (R.26-27, 32-34, 89, 90, 114, 116-17, 552, 1151.) On June 30, 
2010, while the update to the custody evaluation was still in process, the 36th Family 
Court entered a final decree of divorce, granting Mother "custodia definitiva". (R.26-27, 
32-34, 89-90, 114, 552, 1151.) Though roughly translated to mean sole custody, Father 
"still had custody rights, [and Mother] was still prohibited from leaving Mexico." (R.27, 
89-90, 114, 552, 1151.) 
Mother and Father both.appealed the final custody order of the 36th Family Court. 
(R.27, 33, 90, 114, 553, 1151.) Father appealed on the basis that the custody orders were 
against the clear weight of the evidence and that the updated psychological reports were 
still in process. (R.27, 90, 114, 305, 553, 1151, 1153.) The reasons for Mother's appeal 
are unclear. (R.27 n.27, 114, 305.) Nonetheless, the pending cross-appeals suspended or 
otherwise stayed the June 30, 2010 orders granting Mother "custodia definitiva" until the 
appeals could be resolved. (R.33, 90, 116,553, 1151.) 
On November 25, 2010, while the appeal was still pending, Mother and Father 
stipulated to a bifurcated decree of divorce under newly enacted provisions of Mexican 
law that permitted no-fault, expedited proceedings for bifurcation. (R.28, 99, 114, 553, 
562, 805, 1152.) The bifurcation was assigned a separate case number 1529/2010 in the 
9 
Superior Court of Justice for the Federal District, 24th Court of Domestic Affairs ("24th 
Family Court"} (R.12, 90, 114, 125, 199,426, 502, 553, 595, 602, 618, 1152.) While this 
finalized the divorce, the parties stipulated in the decree that their custodial rights were 
left intact in their natural state so that they would be reserved for further litigation in case 
number 1472/2007 in the 36th Family Court. (R.90, 116, 553, 557 n.8.) Specifically, the 
November 25, 2010 bifurcated decree of divorce in case number 1529/2010 provided that 
"given the legal situation of their minor children, named [S] and [R], both with the last 
. . 
name [M-L], is under judgment in the 36th Family Court ofthis City, for which reason 
they request that the present petition be continued. THE JUDGE AGREES. II The 
bifurcated decree further ordered that 
the matrimonial bonds between [Father] and [Mother] are 
hereby dissolved .... In this document, both parties express 
their complete agreement with the ruling made in this 
matter, for which, in this document, they declare that it is 
executable for all legal purposes that may arise. . . . With 
regard to the settlement proposal and counterproposal 
exhibited by the parties, their rights are safeguarded so that, 
if necessary, they may be upheld in the corresponding 
incidence. 
(R.553-54, 596, 1152 (emphases added).) 
Just after entry of the bifurcated decree and while the cross-appeals of the June 30, 
2010 custody determinations remained pending, "[Mother] surreptitiously removed the 
children from Mexico to the United States. She came directly to Orem, Utah and enrolled 
the children in school on December 21, 2010." (R.28, 90, 114.) Though Mother's flight 
remained undiscovered, the Mexican appellate court overturned the custody 
determinations of the 36th Family Court on January 7, 2011, because the award of 
10 
., 
' 
"custodia definitiva" to Mother was inconsistent with the evidence and did not consider 
the pending, court-ordered update to the custody evaluation. (R.29, 90, 554, 1153.) 
Soon afterward, Father discovered that Mother had fled with the children, after 
Mother _repeatedly failed to bring the children for supervised parent-time excha11ges and 
Father's attempts to communicate with the children we_nt unanswered. (R.28.) Once he 
realized Mother had secretly left with their children, Father filed a police report and 
instantly _ began looking for the children in Texas, - where Mother had previously 
absconded to a condominium she owned there. (R.30-31.) 
On February 4, 2011, shortly after the case had been remanded to the 36th Family 
Court, the court-appointed psychologist submitted the updated custody evaluation. The 
psychological report and custody evaluation confirmed and reinforced the findings of the 
original 2008 reports. 3 (R.29, 91, 114.) Specifically, they provided that: 
• The children "did not have emotional indications that were consistent with a 
profile of a child that had suffered violence." (R.91, 114, 366, 554, 583, 1153, 
1182.) 
• "[W]hile the boys both had a negative view of their father, the psychologist noted 
that their perception was without sustaining real or valid experiences and that their 
attitudes are determined by induction and manipulation which their mother has 
3 The federal distric_t court expressly observed _that "The findings in these second 
psychological reports do not vary significantly from the initial reports, prepared in 2008." 
(R.29 n.30, 115, 306, 416, 552, 584, 1151, 1183.) The federal court's fmding is directly 
· contrary to Mother's repeated assertions here that the reports were "at variance." See Br. 
of Appellant at 15, ,r 26; see also R.278, 391,525,552, 950, 1151. 
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ex~rcised upon them." (R.29 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), 91, 
115, 306, 366.) 
• "The psychologist noted that the dread the boys feel about their father is more 
consistent with induction and manipulation attitudes to them than as a result of 
their own experiences and that it is inferred that they have been mostly induced or 
manipulated by their mother." (R.29 n.32 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted), 91, 115, 306, 366.) 
• Mother "had a tendency to lie, dysfunctional behavior patterns which may affect in 
a negative manner the interaction with her family and social environment, that she 
tends to carry out manipulation attitudes in particular with her children, and that 
she had aggressive or violent tendencies, especially of a verbal nature." (R.29-30 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted), 91-92, 115, 306, 367.) 
• Mother "now reported taking the children to a private psychological evaluation to 
confirm use of violence and sexual abuse, which was information [Mother] did not 
express in her first evaluation." (R.29-30 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted), 91-92, 115, 306, 367.) 
• Father had "no indications of aggressive or violent tendencies." (R.30, 87, 92, 115, 
306, 367.) 
• "The psychologist found no reason why [Father] should not live together with his 
children." (R.30, 92, 115,306, 367.) 
In the meantime, Mother perjured herself to obtain an order changing her name 
from "Susan Consuelo Libbey-Aguilera" to her current alias "Brooke Robinson" in the 
District Court for the 7th Judicial District in the State of Idaho on February 9, 2011. 
(R.19, 30, 92, 111, 115, 150, 285, 302, 306, 367.) "As required by Idaho law, [Mother] 
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represented in her name-change petition that she was a resident of Idaho, but [Mother] 
admits now that she has never been a resident of Idaho;" (R.30 n.37, 92, 367, 416.) 
Mother also re-named the children with aliases she had chosen for them, with which she 
enrolled them in school and completed all formal documentation. (R.111, 114, 302, 305.) 
Still unaware of .Mother's location and worried -for the safety of his children, 
Father hired an attorney in Texas. (R.92, 556, 1155:) He continued to search for Mother 
and his children in Texas, eventually expanding the scope of his search to the entire 
United States. (R.92, 556, 1155.) Meanwhile, Mexican law enforcement conducted an 
independent investigation into the children's disappearance, and Mexican authorities filed 
formal criminal charges of Child Trafficking against Mother on September 27, 20124 in 
the 13th District Court of Federal Criminal Proceedings for the Federal District of 
Mexico ("13th Criminal Court"). (R.21, 92, 143-44, 186, 189,363,505, 549, 619.) At the 
very root of the criminal charges is a determination of Mother's custodial rights and 
whether her physical custody and removal of the children from Mexico was legal and/or 
criminal. (R.92, 556.) In addition to a prison sentence, among the potential criminal 
sanctions for a parent's conviction of Child Trafficking in Mexico, is termination · of 
parental rights. (R.343, 505.) · 
4 Mother's arguments are premised on an inaccurate foundation: Mother repeatedly relies 
on her erroneous claim that the criminal charges in Mexico were filed in 2013. See Br. of 
Appellant at 41. Actually, the· record is clear that Mexican authorities filed criminal 
charges against Mother on September 27, 2012. (R.144, 154, 157-87, 189, 619-20, 625, 
633, 1007-08, 1013, 1021.) It is undisputed that Mexico actively maintained continuing 
jurisdiction over custody matters a:t that time. 
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On February 8, 2013, the 36th Family Court revoked th~ prior temporary custody 
orders in case number 14 72/2007 that had given Mother temporary custody of the 
children, leaving the parties to finish litigation of custody in Mexico once Mother and the 
children were located and her criminal charges were addressed or otherwise resolved. 
(R.2, 93, 556, 602, 1168.) Specifically, the February 8, 2013 order declared that upon 
entry of the bifurcated decree of divorce on November 25, 2010, jurisdiction had vested 
in the 24th Court over the divorce and the related custody issues-thereby leaving the 
36th Family Court without the ability to further address the case. (R.389, 556-57, 1155-
56.) Specifically, the 36th Family Court reasoned that "this Judge is legally hindered to 
· amend litis and decree or resolve related issues .... " (R.126, 320, 430, 556-57, 603.) 
(emphasis added.) Consequently, the 36th Family Court of Mexico City set aside all prior 
orders and directed the parties to pursue their custodial claims "at means and manners in 
accordance with the Law as it may proceed before competent authority therefore, and 
before Citizen Judge as might it may correspond by shift." (R.126, 320 430, 557.) 
Thereby, . the 36th Family Court acknowledged that the 24th Family Court had made 
orders reserving the custodial rights of the parties, and it declined to disturb the 
jurisdiction of the 24th Family Court or amend such orders.5 (R.126, 320,430, 557.) 
5 Curiously, Mother here asserts that Utah should usurp Mexico's jurisdiction over the 
custody issues reserved by the 24th Family Court, citing as the basis to do so, the refusal 
of 36th Family Court to disturb that very jurisdiction, which it determined was reserved 
by its sister court and vested in its orders. (See R.126, 557, 1156, 1202 (setting aside 
proceedings because court was "legally hindered to amend litis" (i.e., the other case).) 
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Law enforcement located Mother in Utah in May 2013: (R.31, 93, 115, 306, 367, 
974.) Upon locating Mother, Mexican authorities immediately began extradition 
proceedings through diplomatic channels, seeking Mother's return to Mexico to answer 
the pending criminal charges for Child Trafficking. (R.93, 141-53, 282, 285, 367.) 
Simultaneously, on June 7, 2013, Father initiated a Petition for Immediate Return 
of Children Pursuant to the Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction 
Remedies Act in the Federal District Court for the District of Utah. (R.3, 93, 390, 524, 
557.); see also Matas-Vidal v. Libbey-Aguilera, No. 2:13CV422DAK, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 110630 (D. Utah, Aug. 5, 2013) (unpublished). On August 5, 2013, after several 
evidentiary hearings, the U.S. Federal District Court for the District of Utah ruled on the 
Petition for Immediate Return. (R.3, 88 n.1, 93, 110-24, 277-78, 301-14.) The federal 
court found and ruled that: 
• "SM-Land RM-L were habitually resident in Mexico City at the time of removal. 
The children were born in Mexico City and never lived ~nywhere other than 
Mexico until [Mother] removed them to the United States in December 2010." 
(R.32, 93, 116, 368.) 
·, . 
• "[Mother]'s removal of the children from Mexico violated [Father]'s rights of 
custody that arose under the laws of Mexico and therefore, the removal was 
wrongful." (R.35, 94, 117, 368.) 
• . The evidence did not support Mother's allegation "that there is a grave risk that the 
return of the children wo~ld expose them to physical or psychological harm or 
otherwise place them in an intolerable situation." (R.36, 94, 117, 368.) 
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• Mother's evolving story of abuse and domestic violence was not credible and her 
statements regarding the same were inconsistent, given that she had previously 
admitted in court documents that "he had never physically assaulted me." (R.37, 
94, 117, 368.) 
• "[T]he psychological reports submitted in the case do not suggest that [Father] was 
abusive toward his wife or children." (R.37, 94, li8, 368.) 
• "Indeed, the initial psychological report states that 'with regard to ·the children, 
[Father] was identified as having an affective bond toward them, showing interest 
and concern for them, affective and normative toward them, so there are no 
problems for coexistence.' The final report reached the same conclusion." (R.37, 
94, 118, 188, 368.) 
• "Indeed, the supplemental reports suggest [Mother] had manipulated her children 
to dislike their father." (R.37, 94, 118, 368.) 
• Mother had submitted false and fraudulent translations of negative comments the 
children had allegedly made during a mediation session. (R.38, 94, 118, 369.) In 
fact, the accurate translation indicated that "when SM-L was questioned, he 
· declared he loved and wanted to visit with his father. His negative comment was 
that his father lied to the boys by saying he would play with them, then did not." 
(R.38, 94, 118, 369.) 
• "The family pediatrician never noticed any type· of evidence· that would suggest 
any type of physical abuse." (R.38, 95, 118, 369.) 
• The parties' marriage counselor provided testimony that "she saw no issues of 
violence between them, and neither party mentioned any violence in the home." 
(R.38-39, 95, 118, 369.) 
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• hi the federal judge's in camara interview with the children, who were ages IO and 
12 years old at the time, they each claimed memories of abuse from as young as 
15 months of age. (R.95, 369, 559, 1158.) "While the court cannot divine what 
actually happened in these various incidents, what is clear is that both children 
discussed these events with the court as though they had clear memories of the 
occurrences, which the court does not find plausible, given their ages at the time." 
(R.39 (emphasis added), 95, 118, 369.) 
• "The court finds that [Mother] has not demonstrated . . . that there is evidence of 
'serious abuse or neglect,' and that even if there were, she has not demonstrated 
that Mexican courts would be incapable of providing adequate protection." (R.41, 
95, 119, 369.) 
• Yet, despite the wrongful removal, the federal court found that in the three years 
that Mother successfully concealed the children iri ·Utah, they had become "settled 
in their new environment," (R.44, 95, 120, 123, 279, 392, 526.), and that the 
children had reached an "age and maturity" that the court must consider their 
wishes, even iflargely the result of Mother's "undue influence." (R.49-51, 95, 123, 
281,393, 559-60.) 
• Consequently, the federal court found that the limited scope of the Hague 
Convention, as implemented in the United States by the International Child 
Abduction and Remedy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610, did not warrant the 
immediate return of the children to Mexico. (R.52, 96, 560, 1159.) Because the 
only remedy under the Hague Conventi_on is limited to immediate return of the 
children, the court was "convinced that the return of these children to·Mexico City 
_ at this time and under these circumstances-however wrongfully the 
circumstances have arisen-would severely traumatize these children." (R.52, 96, 
124, 281, 560.) 
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• "The court emphasize[ d] that this decision .has a limited purpose and effect." 
(R.52,96, 124,281,394,528J 
• "The court's decision in this case is not based in any way on a belief that the courts 
of Utah will do a better job than the courts in Mexico City 1n addressing this 
unfortunate custody situation. To the contrary, the court is certain that the courts 
of Mexico City would be fully capable of handling this litigation." (R.51, 96, 123-
24, 560.) 
• "In addition, the court has no doubt that [Father] genuinely wants to see his 
. children and have a relationship with them, and the court hopes such a relationship 
can develop in the future." (R.51-52, 96, 124, 370.) 
With no further analysis of state court jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, the federal 
court assumed in closing dicta that its decision "merely establishes that the boys will not 
be re.turned to Mexico but remain in Utah for any custody proceedings that are initiated 
here. In light of the pending Extradition proceedings against [Mother], however, the 
future remains uncertain for this family." (R.52, 96, 124, 281, 394, 560-61.) Upon this 
passing statement, Mother has presumed that Utah courts could assume jurisdiction and 
disregard all prior orders and pending child custody proceedings. in Mexico. (R.97, 561, 
1160.) 
Father initially appealed the federal district court's Hague ruling on a very narrow 
basis. (R.561, 1160.) The federal court declined to order return of the children to Mexico 
based on· an exception in the Hague Convention allowing children that have been "well 
settled" in their new home for over one year to stay put. (R.42-49, 119-123 (citing art. 12 
of the Hague Convention).) Father argued on appeal that the one-year period should have 
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been equitably tolled based ori Mother's deceitful misconduct. (R.561, 1160.) At the time, 
there'-was a split between the federal circuits as to whether equitable tolling applied to the 
Hague Convention's "well s~ttled" defense. (R. 42-49, 119-123.) While Father's appeal 
was pending, but before briefing was scheduled, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the 
circuit split in Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1236 (2014), which held 
equitable tolling does not apply. The Lozano decision mooted Father's legal argument, so 
he unilaterally withdrew his appeal. (R.561, 1160.) Contrary to Mother's insinuations, no 
appellate court considered the federal district court's Hague decision, nor ever condoned 
Mother's misbehavior. 
On August 29, 2013, immediately after the federal court entered its decision, 
Mother filed several petitions seeking "amparo" in Mexico (i.e., shelter or protection 
under the Mexican Constitution) from enforcement of the arrest warrant, extradition, and 
criminal prosecution. (R.97, 286,-561.) Roughly analogous to a request for extraordinary 
relief and/or habeas corpus proceedings in the U.S. legal system, Mother collaterally 
attacked the constitutionality of her criminal charges in an attempt to avoid extradition. 
(R:563, 617-686.) She argued that the potential termination of her parental rights upon a 
conviction of Child Trafficking amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. (R.97, 343-
44, 561-62, 571.) Mother's claims were repeatedly rejected and appealed. (R.563, 617-
686.) Through a seemingly never-ending string of legal proceedings and delays instigated 
by Mother, her challenge to her criminal charges eventually landed in Mexico's National 
Supreme Court of Justice. (R.617-686, 687-756.) 
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Notably, Mexico's National Supreme Court of Justice issued a 70-page written 
opinion rejecting Mother's claims. (R.617-686, 687-756.) The court acknowledged that 
the potential termination of Mother's parental rights was a harsh and serious sanction, but 
it also concluded that such a punishment for the crime of Child Trafficking was not 
unconstitutional on its face. (R.617-86, 687-756.) The court concluded that because 
Mother had not yet been tried and such a punishment had not yet been imposed, there 
was no factual record for her as-applied challenge and her claims were not ripe for 
review. (R.684.) 
On March 27, 2014, Father again renewed his custody claims before the family 
courts of Mexico, requesting orders that required Mother to return the children to Mexico 
to conclude or otherwise address the custody issues reserved for further proceedings in 
the 24th Family Court on November 25, 2010, and in the 36th Family Court on February 
8, 2013, until-at the very least-the pending criminal case regarding Mother's custodial 
and parental rights could be resolved in the 13th Criminal Court. (R.97, 562.) 
In the meantime, Mother filed in Utah a Verified Petition to Establish Custody of 
¥inor Children, Payment of Child Support and Alimony, Entry of Restraining Order, and 
for Attorney Fees, thereby initiating the present action on November 18, 2013. (R.1-57.) 
Mother served Father nearly six months later at his home in Mexico City, on May 13, 
2014. (R.97, 562.) 
On June 12, 2014, Father filed the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and 
a Verified Memorandum in Support thereof, on the basis that the Utah Uniform Child 
Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, UTAH CODE §§ 78B-13-101 et seq., and the 
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Utah Unifomi Interstate Family Support Act, UTAH CODE §§ 7813-14-101 et seq., 
prohibited Utah from entertaining Mother's custody and support claims or conduct 
proceedings simultaneous to those of Mexico. (R.81-83.) Father argued that such 
previously filed proceedings and orders vested Mexico with continuing exclusive 
jurisdiction, and prohibited Utah from infringing upon the same. (R.86-107.) 
In the meantime, Mexico continued to demand Mother's extradition. On 
September 23, 2014, a federal magistrate judge in the United States Federal District 
Court for the District of Utah determined there was sufficient evidence to find probable 
cause that Mother had committed the crime of Child Trafficking. (R.352, 395, 530, 
1163.) The federal magistrate judge entered an order certifying Mother to be extradited to 
Mexico to face the criminal charges pending against her in the 13th Criminal Court. 
Mother was arrested and held in the custody of U.S. federal marshals while her 
extradition proceeded. (R.349-52, 370.) 
On October 20, 2014, Father's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction came for 
hearing before the domestic commissioner. (R.81-271, 797-98.) Mother remained in the 
custody of U.S. federal marshals for the purpose of extradition; and she was not present at 
the hearing. Mother's counsel moved for a continuance and offered into evidence a letter 
from the Assistant United 'States Attorney in the District of Utah. Therein, the Assistant 
United States Attorney explained that 
[Mother] has been charged in Mexico with parental 
kidnapping. In effect, she removed her two minor boys from 
Mexico to the United States in violation of a Mexican family 
court 'order requiring her to .remain in Mexico, until a.final 
ruling was issued by the court. She is currently in federal 
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custody until the State Department decides whether to grant 
Mexico's request for her extradition. 
I believe the [federal magistrate judge] is willing to allow for 
her temporary release so she may attend the domestic_ hearing. 
However, I need a few days to obtain the necessary court 
order .... If you believe she should attend the hearing ... , I 
will appreciate additional time to seek an order and make 
arrangements for her to attend the hearing. 
(R.378) (emphasis added). 
Father opposed Mother's request for a continuance, but he did not object to 
admission of the U.S. Attorney's letter and it was received into the record. (R.378.) After 
argument, the domestic commissioner denied the continuance. (R.56, 377, 500-08, 798.) 
The court then proceeded to consider Father's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, 
based on undisputed facts contained in the verified pleadings and taking judicial notice of 
the related proceedings, various Mexican court orders, and other court records submitted 
by the parties. (R.81-271, 797-98.) At no point did Mother's counsel request or assert that 
the domestic commissioner should confer or otherwise communicate with Mexican courts 
about jurisdictional issues. (R.272-335.) 
The domestic commissioner recommended that the case be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction on at least three separate, independent, and alternative grounds. (R.377, 853-
61, 931-34.) First, the domestic commissioner recommended that Mexi~o's continuing 
jurisdiction over child custody proceedings attached upon the commencement of custody 
proceedings and the initial custody determination made in 2007, thereby precluding 
Utah's exercise of jurisdiction in the matter, as provided in Utah Code .§78B-13-201(1). 
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(R.377, 853-61, 931-34.) Next, the domestic commissioner recommended that Utah 
lackedjurisdiction to entertain simultaneous custody proceedings or otherwise modify the 
· existing custody determinations and rights which had been · reserved for further 
proceedings by the courts' orders in Mexico. (R.377, 853-61, 931-34.) And finally, the 
domestic commissioner determined that "even if this Court had a basis to exercise 
jurisdiction it declines to do so as a result of Mother's unjustifiable conduct" under Utah 
Code section 78B-13-208. (R. 853-61, 931-34.) 
Mother objected to the commissioner's recommendation, pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 108. (R.381-470.) After a second round of briefing, the district court 
judge held a hearing on Mother's objection to the domestic commissioner's 
recommendation on March 5, 2015. (R.916, 919-36.) Again, Mother did not request that 
the district court judge communicate or . confer with any Mexican court regarding 
jurisdictional issues. (R.381-470.) Upon conclusion of the hearing, the district court judge 
overruled Mother's objection, stating that 
(R.920). 
[t]here are both civil and criminal proceedings pending in 
Mexico wherein the custody of the parties' minor children and · 
· the parties' parental rights remain at issue. This indicates to 
the Court that Mexico has not abandoned ·and otherwise 
continues to exercise jurisdiction over issues of child custody. 
Consequently, this court is without and otherwise declines to 
assert child custody jurisdiction. 
Thereafter, .Mother filed Petitioner's Rules 52 and 59 Motion to Amend Order 
Dated March 17, 2015. (R.937-1002.) Therein, Mother reasserted her same arguments, 
and obliquely claimed for the very first time that the domestic commissioner should have 
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communicated with the courts of Mexico, citing Utah Code section 78B-13-206(1). 
(R.958-59.) Mother's entire claim was contained in a single statement in the introduction 
of her supporting memorandum that "even if proceedings had existed, .the Commissioner 
failed to undertake the steps to communicate with the courts in Mexico and otherwise 
failed to identify any evidence of the continued proceedings or viable orders." (R.946.) 
Father opposed reopening the matter. Mother neither requested oral argument on her 
motion nor filed a reply memorandum to Father's opposition. (R.1147-1229, 1233-35.) 
The district court entered its Ruling and Order on Petitioner's Motion to Amend 
Order on April 30, 2015. (R.1238-40.) After setting forth the applicable standards under 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 59, the district court ruled that 
In [Mother J's memorandum, she devotes significant 
time to restating facts which have previously been presented. 
She then argues that the Court should amend its prior 
judgment, relying upon prior error as grounds for amending 
_judgment under Rule 59. However, the arguments asserted 
are not new and are no more persuasive now than they were 
when presented initially. Because [Mother]'s objection to the 
Commissioner and this Court's decision regarding jurisdiction 
has been fully heard and considered, this Court declines to 
exercise its discretion to amend judgment under Rule 5 9. 
(R.1239-40.) 
Based on the foregoing, [Mother]'s motion to amend 
judgment is DENIED. 
Mother filed her notice of appeal on May 21, 2015. (R.1241.) 
Subsequent to the notice of appeal, on December 17, 2015, the 13th Criminal 
Court convicted Mother of Child Trafficking on the charges that had been pending 
against her since September 27, 2012. The court conditionally sentenced Mother to one 
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year and six months in prison, with 200 days of statutory fines under Mexican law. In its 
ruling, the 13th Criminal Court declined· to terminate Mother's parental rights at this 
point, and she has been ordered to return the children· to Mexico· for further proceedings 
and to begin their reunification process with Father. Upon information and belief, that the 
sentence has been appealed.6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court appropriately granted Father's rule 12(b )(1) motion to dismiss 
Mother's petition for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of child custody. The 
Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), UTAH 
CODE §§ 78B-13-101 et seq., governs Utah's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over 
child custody disputes. Part 2 of the UCCJEA confines Utah's exercise of child custody 
jurisdiction to one of three explicit statutory bases. Specifically, to entertain custody 
proceedings, Utah must have "initial child custody jurisdiction" under Utah Code section 
78B-13-201, "jurisdiction to modify determination" under Utah Code section 78B-13-
203, or "temporary emergency jurisdiction" under Utah Code section 78B-13-204. Of 
these statutory bases for child cu'stody jurisdiction; on appeal Mother argues only that 
6 Understandably,. there has been a significant amount of administrative delay with 
respect to the parties' access to records and orders from the courts in Mexico, as well as 
in the· Apostille-certification process required under the Hague Convention to 
authenticate foreign orders for international use. Father has already requested such 
records regarding Mother's· criminal sentence and their effect pending appeal. As soon as 
such records are received, reviewed, and .translated, Father will file notice with this Court 
and take any other appropriate action. · 
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Utah has "initial child custody jurisdiction," under_Utah Code section 78B-13-201.7 In 
doing so, . Mother misconstrues the availability and purpose of "initial child custody 
jurisdiction" under Utah Code section 78B-12-201, and her appeal necessarily must fail. 
First, although Mother acknowledges several custody orders initially entered in 
Mexico, Mother asserts that Utah may still exercise "initial child custody jurisdiction" to 
make another and/or a subsequent "initic~.l" determination. Meanwhile, Mother disregards 
the existence and ongoing validity of effective custody determinations from Mexico-the 
last of which revoked Mother'~ "custodia definitiva" and restored Father's custodial rights 
to their natural state. Such custody determinations are not subject to modification through 
the exercise of "initial child custody jurisdiction." Compare id. § 78B-13-201(1) 
("jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination") (emphasis added) with id. 
§ 78B-13-203(2) (depriving Utah of "jurisdiction to modify determination" when a parent 
or child still lives in another issuing state). 
Next, even assuming there were . no prior effective custody determinations, the 
criminal case against Mother for child trafficking-and for which she was extradited-is 
a "child custody proceeding" as defined under the UCCJEA. Jd. § 78R-13-102(3). Under 
Utah Code section 78B-13-206(1), this preexisting and ongoing custody proceeding strips 
7 Below, the domestic commissioner also addressed Utah's lack of "jurisdiction to modify 
determination" under Utah Code section 78B-13-203 and "temporary emergency 
jurisdiction" under Utah Code section 7813~13-204. (R.853-61 ,r,r 16, 20; 931-34.) Mother 
does not analyze either of these statutory bases for jurisdiction or raise them as grounds 
for her appeal. Accordingly, Father addresses sue:& jurisdictional bases only as relevant to 
the analysis of Utah's lack of "initial child custody jurisdiction" under Utah Code section 
78B-13-201. . 
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Utah of any potential jurisdiction to entertain simultaneous proceedings wherein the 
subject matter of "legal custody, physical custody, or parent-time with respect to a child 
is at issue ... [or] in which the issue may appear." Id § 78B-13-102(4). 
Finally, as an independent and alternative basis for dismissal, the district court 
appropriately declined to exercise any potential jurisdiction because of Mother's 
unjustifiable conduct under Utah Code section 78B-13-208(1). See id ("[I]f a court of 
this state has jurisdiction ... because a person invoking the jurisdiction has engaged in 
unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction .... "). (R:859-60.) 
Further, Mother's recent accusations of judicial misconduct and alleged impropriety are 
grossly unwarranted. See Br. of Appellant at 34 (alleging "the court conducted some kind 
of prohibited undisclosed fact finding process and weighing of evidence that resulted in 
the findings made by the court"). 
ARGUMENT 
Utah has no authority to enter custody orders m this case. In assessing the limits of 
Utah's child custody jurisdiction, "A court of this state shall treat a foreign country as a 
state of the United States". UTAH CODE § 78B-13-105(1). Thus, the extensive history of 
custody orders and proceedings in Mexico· must be afforded the same respect as would 
apply to the orders and proceedings from any other state in the routine inter-jurisdictional 
analysis under Part 2 of the Utah Uniform Child Custody and· Jurisdiction Act 
. ("UCCJEA"). Id.§§ 78B-13-201-210. 
As set forth below, jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination is 
inapplicable given that Mexico made the initial determination long ago. Even where that 
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initial determination has qeen later modified, set aside, and/or ultimately res.erved for 
further proceedings, the exclusive and continuing jurisdiction of Mexico has. vested, and 
Mexico alone retains· the authority to conduct subsequent proceedings contemplated by 
its orders or to modify the orders preserving the parties' custodial rights. Moreover, the 
· fact that Mexico's. standing custody determination has restored custodial rights to a prior 
unaltered state does not confer upon Utah authority to infringe upon Mexico's jurisdiction 
in the matter, and Utah courts are prohibited from conducting simultaneous custody 
proceedings. Finally, irrespective of the foregoing, Mother's wrongful removal of the 
children from their habitual residence in Mexico and her success in subsequently 
concealing them in Utah cannot serve as a basis for child custody jurisdiction .. Rather, it 
is unjustifiable conduct and Utah must decline jurisdiction. 
I. Initial Child Custody Jurisdiction Does Not Apply. 
Mother's reliance on the "initial child custody jurisdiction" provided in Utah Code 
section 78B-13-201 is misplaced because (a) Mexico made the relevant initial child 
custody determination long ago, and (b) Mexico retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction 
over each of its subsequent . orders of modification~ including the standing -order that 
currently governs the parties' custodial rights. 
a. The Initial Custody Determination Was Already Made . 
. Mexico previously made the initial.child custody determination, precluding Utah's 
exercise of jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78B-13-201 to do the same thing. 
Section 201 sets forth the conditions upon which "a court of this state has jurisdiction to 
make an initial child custody determination .... " Id. § 78B-13-201(1) (emphasis added). 
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As Mother acknowledges, "There were two actions filed in Mexico .... The first or main 
action involved proceedings related to the ... custody of the minor children: There were 
numerous hearings and orders issued by the court m that original divorce/custody-action." 
Br. of Appellant ,at 8, , 4. The first of these "orders issued by the court in that original 
divorce/custody action" was the initial child custody determination contemplated by the 
UCCJEA. 
Mother does not address the inherent inconsistency and legal impossibility of the 
second "initial determination" she seeks under Utah Code section 78B-13-201. The 
UCCJEA defines "initial determination" as "the first child custody determination . 
concerning a particular child." Id. § 78B-13-102(8). "Child custody determination" is 
defined broadly as any i•order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, 
or parent-time with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, 
and modification order." UTAH CODE § 78B-12-102(3) (emphasis added). Once a state 
properly makes the initial determination, it retains "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction 
over the determination" including over any subsequent modification, until such 
jurisdiction is otherwise released by the appropriate court after ·making 'the required 
findings under the UCCJEA . .See id § 78B-13-202(1)(a) - (b) (permitting only courts of 
issuing state to release exclusive, continuing jurisdiction for lack of "significant 
connection" or "substantial evidence," but allowing "a court of this state or a court of 
another state" to terminate exclusive custody jurisdiction when neither children nor 
parents remain in issuing state); see also In re Z.Z., 2013 UT App 215,, 5, 310 P.3d 772 
(noting that Utah retained exclusive, continuing custody jurisdiction for modification of 
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initial determination unless "one of the two determinations from subsection 202(1) was 
made prior to the [modification] proceedings"). Once. the initial custody determinat~on 
h~s be.en ma<,ie, the UCCJEA deems any subsequent determination a "modification." 
UTAH CODE § 78B-13-102(11) (defining "modification" as "a child custody 
determination that changes, replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous 
determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that 
made the previous determination" (emphasis added)). 
Mother seeks relief under section 201 of the UCCJEA. However, the introductory 
sentence of section 201 qualifies it as the basis "to make an initial custody 
determination," and its plain language does not extend to subsequent determinations or 
modification proceedings. Rather, jurisdiction for a subsequent custody determination 
must arise within the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction vested in a state that issues the 
initial determination under Utah, Code section 78B-13-202 or from the "jurisdiction to 
modify determination" of another state, afforded under Utah Code section 78B-13:-203. 
Mother has not asserted either of these as bases for jurisdiction.in Utah because-simply 
put-thef:do not apply. 
Here, it is undisputed that the 36th Family Court in Mexico had jurisdiction to 
make an initial custody determination in October 2007, and that it exercised . that 
jurisdiction to make the initial custody determination entered on October 16, 2007. In the 
continuing exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction over this initial . determination, Mexico 
made further determinations that llchange[d], replace[d], supersede[d], or [were] 
otherwise made after a previous determination." Id. § 78B-13-102(11) (defining 
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"modification"). These modifications include orders entered in Mexico regarding the 
parties' respective rights of legal custody, physical custody, and parent-time with their 
minor children on October 16, 2007, December 14, 2007, June 30, 2010, November 25, 
2010, January 7, 2011, and February 8, 2013. (R.18-52, 86-105, 125-31, 275-76.) Given 
these prior custody orders, the proceedings that Mother has attempted to commence in 
Utah could not result in an initial custody determination for these children. Consequently, 
the "jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination" provided in Utah Code section 
78B-13-201 cannot possibly serve as the basis for Utah to entertain Mother's current 
requests for subsequent custody determinations and modifications. 
b. Mexico's Orders Preserving and Restoring Prior Custodial Rights Are Standing 
Child Custody Determinations. 
Mother disregards the existing Mexican orders and fails to recognize that they 
contain standing custody determinations, not subject to modification in Utah. The 
Mexican orders are effective child custody determinations under the plain terms of the 
UCCJEA because they provide for or otherwise govern the parties' respective rights of 
custody with regard to their children. See id. § 78B-13-102(3) (defining "child custody 
determination" as "an order of a court providing for custody" ( emphasis added)). A Utah 
court cannot modify these standing custody determinations unless: (a) a Mexican court 
releases exclusive jurisdiction over its prior determination, id § 78B-13-203(1) (requiring 
"the court of the other state [to] determine it no longer has exclusive, continuing 
jurisdiction" or to decline jurisdiction for forum non conveniens), or "a court of this state 
or a court of the other state determines that neither the child, nor a parent . . . presently 
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resides in the other state," id. § 78B-13-203(2). Becaµse Mexico has never released its 
exclusive, ccmtinuing jurisdiction and because Father stiH lives in Mexico, Utah lacks 
jurisdiction to modify any existing child custody determination from Mexico. 
By design, the UCCJEA defines "child custody determination" very broadly, 
encompassing an order which "provid[es] for the legal custody, physical custody, or 
parent-time with respect to a child." Id § 78B-12-102(3). An order providing for physical 
custody is much broader and "involve[s] much more than actual possession and care of a 
child." Hansen v. Hansen, 2012 UT 9,115,270 P.3d 531, 534. A custody determination 
includes any order providing for the "legal duty to provide control and supervision" or 
"responsibility for the child's welfare." Id 1 16 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(describing the breadth of physical custody). Similarly, a child custody determination 
embraces any order providing for the "power and duty to make the most significant 
decisions about a child's life" or even "authority to make necessary day-to-day decisions 
concerning the child's welfare." Id. 1 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, 
encompassed within the UCCJEA's definition of child custody determination is any order 
"providing for" legal responsibilities, duties, and/or authority with· respect to a child's 
care, supervision, and/or the ability to make significant or routine decisions affecting a 
child's welfare. UTAH CODE§ 78B-13-102(3). 
Mother asserts that despite six years of child custody proceedings conducted under 
Mexico's exclusive, continuing child custody jurisdiction, the standing orders of Mexico 
are devoid of any child custody determination under the UCCJEA. Mother does not 
dispute that Mexico had child custody jurisdiction when custody proceedings were 
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initiated in: October 2007 in the 36th ·Family Court, case number 1427/2007. (R.275, 
387.) Below and here on appeal she repeatedly touts that the 36th Family Court awarded 
her "custodia definitiva" on June 30, 2010, even while she de-emphasizes that the order 
was irrimediately stayed and ultimately overturned on appeal for lacking support in the 
evidence. See Br. of Appellant at 8-9 if4, 10-11 ,r11, 13 if 19, 27, 39, etc. Further, Mother 
does not contest Mexico's jurisdiction for the bifurcation proceedings in the 24th Family 
Court, case number 1529/2010, resulting in entry of the stipulated decree of bifurcation 
on November 25, 2010, and dissolution of the marriage, while explicitly reserving the 
parties' custody rights for further determination. (R.276, 388). In fact, Mother concedes 
that Mexico had child custody jurisdiction for at least six years after custody proceedings 
first commenced and ·for at least three years after she abducted the children and fled 
Mexico in December 2010. Instead, Mother claims that the last order of the 36th Family 
·Court rendered void ab initio ·the history and progression of all the various prior 
proceedings and modifications of the parties' custodial rights. 
The effective orders from both Mexico's 24th and 36th Family Court each raised 
and expressly reserved the parties' custodial rights. In doing so, these courts "provided 
for" child custody, given that their determinations govern the parties' rights and one must 
look to their orders to determine the present status of any rights of legal custody, physical 
custody, and parent-time with respect to the parties' children. 
Specifically, the standing order of the 24th Family Court, entered on November 
25, 2010, provided for custody when it "safeguarded" or otherwise reserved the parties' 
existing custody rights. (R.553-54, 596.) After hearing the parties' conflicting custody 
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proposals, the Court det.ermined that no settlement was possible "given that the legal 
situation of their min9r children, named [SJ and [R], both with the last name [M-L], is 
under judgrp.ent in• the Thirty-Sixth Family Court of _this City." (R.553-54, 596.) 
Consequently, the 24th Family Court granted a stipulated bifurcation, th~reby dissolving 
the marriage but reserving custody issues an,d stating that "[w]ith regard to the settlement 
proposal and counterproposal exhibited by the parties, their rights are safeguarded so 
that, if necessary, they may be upheld in the corresponding incidence." (R.554, 596, 
1152.) (emphasis added).) 
. Additionally, the standing order of the 36th Family Court, entered on February 8, 
2013, provided for custody when it set aside all prior custody orders that gave Mother a 
superior right to custody of the children, and it restored Father's custodial rights to their 
prior unaltered state. The 36th Family Court specifically ruled that when the 24th Family 
Court previously dissolved the marriage and reserved the issues of custody, the parties 
"were left safe in their rights so that within corresponding incidental means they may 
enforced [sic]". (R.125, 319, 429.) It set aside its prior orders, concluding that "this Judge 
·is legally hindered to amend litis and decree or. resolve related issues that are merely 
accessory to the divorce granted by the 24th Family Court ... " (R.126 ( emphasis added), 
320, 430, 557). Consequently, it directed the parties "that said prerogative may. be 
enforceable at means and manners in accordance with the Law as it may proceed before 
competent authority therefore, and before Citizen Judge as might it may correspond by 
shift." 
34 
Both the November 2010 order of the 24th Family Court and the February 8, 2013 
order of the 36th Family Court reserved the parties' custody rights. They provide for or 
otherwise dictate the current status of the parties' custody over their children. Currently, 
they govern legal custody, physical custody, and parerit-time of these children. Viewed in 
light of the extensive custody proceedings and prior determinations, these orders worked 
a significant modification of custody. In fact, the February 8, 2013 order expanded 
Father's then-existing rights of custody and restored them to their natural, pre-litigation 
state. By their very terms, these are orders "providing for the legal custody, physical 
custody, or parent-time with respect to a child." UTAH CODE § 78B-13-102(3). In other 
words, they are existing child custody determinations, for which Utah lacks jurisdiction 
to modify. 
c. Mexico Did Not Abandon/ts Exclusive, Continuing Child Custody Jurisdiction. 
Mexico 'Yas . not divested of its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over child 
custody matters simply because the 36th Family Court entered an order of modification, 
set aside the previously-effective custody orders and terminated case number 1427/2007. 
Contrary to Mother's assertions, custody was expressly reserved for further proceedings 
in Mexico. Specifically, the order left the parties "safe in their rights so that within 
c~rresponding incidental means they may [be] enforced," (R.125, 319, 429.), and "with 
the understanding that said prerogative may be enforceable at means and manners in 
accordance with the Law as it may proceed before competent authority, and before 
Citizen Judge as might it may correspond by shift [sic]". (R.126, 320, 430, 557.) As this 
Court has previously held, "a court does not divest itself of exclusive, continuing 
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jurisdiction ; when it . . . closes out a case that lies • dormant-albeit still alive and 
jurisdictionally sound." In re Z.Z., 2013 UT App 215, ,r 16,310 P.3d 772, 777. 
The domestic commissioner articulated his reasoning, as follows: 
9. ... Mexico had jurisdiction in October 2007 
when child custody proceedings were initiated in the 36th 
Court of Family Matters in the Federal District of Mexico in 
case number 1427/2007 and ... the subsequent bifurcation in 
the 24th Court of Family Matters in the Federal District of 
Mexico in case number 1529/2010 further confirmed that 
jurisdiction and reserved the parties custodial rights as 
subject to further litigation therein in November 2010. 
10. Mexico reserved the right to enter additional 
order [sic] regarding the custody of these children, and no 
Mexico· court has vacated that order or otherwise 
unreserved the right to conclude custody proceedings there. 
11. The fact that Mother thereafter fled the 
jurisdiction-even if she believes she was authorized to do 
so-does not change the fact that there were pending child 
custody proceedings in Mexico at the time. 
12. Mexico had child custody jurisdiction. It had 
jurisdiction over both parties, it had home-state jurisdiction 
over the children, and it. had jurisdiction over .the child 
custody action pending before it. Such jurisdiction is 
continuing and exclusive in nature. Mexico never gave up 
or abandoned its jurisdiction over its prior orders or the 
various proceedings that remain pending there. 
16. If Mother desires to modify the parties existing 
custodial rights, as articulated in the orders from Mexico, 
she must seek modification in the courts of Mexico .. "[A] 
court of this state may not modify a child custody 
determination made by a court of another state unless ... 
neither the child, nor a parent, nor any person acting as _a _ 
parent presently resides in the other state." UTAH CODE § 
78B-13-203(2). Father continues to reside in Mexico, and the 
courts there retain exclusive jurisdiction over modification of 
their orders. 
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(R.855-57 (last alteration in original) (emphases added).) The domestic commissioner's 
analysis is entirely consistent with controlling Utah case law, wherein this Court has 
affirmed that "Jurisdiction attaches at the commencement· of a proceeding" and that a 
subsequent dismissal of the custody proceeding does not divest the court of its exclusive, 
continuing child custody jurisdiction. In re .Z.Z., 2013 UT App 215, 'if 16 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
In In re Z.Z., DCFS filed a petition to commence custody proceedings. in July 
2009. Id 'if 3. The juvenile court conducted a shelter hearing and made an initial 
determination in temporary orders. Id. Even so, DCFS was unable to take custody 
because "the parents had fled to Colorado with their children." Id 'if'if 3-4. Unable to 
locate them, DCFS eventually moved to dismiss the case. Id. 'if 4. Consequently, the 
juvenile court entered an order terminating State of Utah's custody and guardianship case 
while also stating "that the Court retain jurisdiction in this matter" in the event the family 
returns. Id 'if 4. The children later returned to Utah. Id. 'if 5. Even though they were not in 
the state long enough to reestablish Utah as their home-state, DCFS filed a second 
petition and renewed its initial custody claims. Id The juvenile court resumed its exercise 
of jurisdiction and eventually terminated parental rights. Id 'if 7. Parents appealed, 
arguing that the prior dismissal of proceedings divested Utah of subject matter 
jurisdiction over custody; such that Utah was no longer the children's home-state for 
custody proceedings commenced by the second petition. Id 'if 11. 
This Court rejected parents' arguments, and affirmed the juvenile court's exclusive, 
continuing jurisdiction. It ruled that "a plain reading of ... the court's order did nothing 
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more than terminate the gu~dianship and custody ca~~ and retain its jurisdiction 'in this 
.· . ". ' 
matter,"' thereby "leaving the. door open for continued proceedings should any of the 
family members return to Utah.llfd. ,r 14. This Court further held that 
The. juvenile c.ourt's retention of jurisdjction here is both 
proper and fully consistent with the scheme and philosophy of 
the UCCJEA. 'Jurisdiction attaches at the 
commencement of a proceeding. If State A had jurisdiction 
under this section at the time a modification proceeding was 
commenced there, it would not be lost by all parties moving 
out of the State prior to the conclusion of [the] proceeding.' 
Thus, an uncooperative set of parents cannot unilaterally 
divest the c~urt of its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction by 
fleeing to another state during the pendency of a custody 
proceeding .... And along largely parallel lines, a court does 
not divest itself of jurisdiction when it allows DCFS to close 
out a case that lies dormant-albeit still alive and 
jurisdictionally sound-merely because the family absconded 
to another state. This is especially true where, as here, the 
court explicitly retains jurisdiction in its dismissal order. 
Were the law otherwise, conniving parents could easily 
render a custody proceeding null and void, and 
consequently destroy a court's jurisdiction, by rounding up 
their children and hightailing it to a neighboring state. The 
purposes and goals of the UCCJEA would be nearly 
impossible to accomplish because they would be subject to 
and entirely contingent upon the whims of parents and their 
level of willingness to be bound by the orders of a court · 
properly possessing and · exercising jurisdiction. · Such a 
system would be untenable, and we decline to adopt a view of 
the statute that allows parents . to unilateraJly upend a 
court's proper exercise of jurisdiction by leaving the state 
while a proceeding is pending. 
Id ,r 16 (second alteration in original) (emphases added) (interpal citations omitted). 
Similarly, Mother cannot unilaterally upend Mexico's exercise of exclusive, continuing 
jurisdiction by absconding with the children and concealing their whereabouts from 2010 
. . 
until 2013, all while proceedings remained pending in its courts. Rather, the 24th and 
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36th Family Courts of Mexico retained Mexico's exclusive jurisdiction when they 
expressly re·served the parties' rights of custody for further proceedings. Consequently, 
Mexico's exclusive jurisdiction remains intact, and it precludes Utah's jurisdiction to hear 
Mother's custody claims. 
II. Utah Cannot Entertain Simultaneous Proceedings. 
Mother has been criminally charged with child trafficking in Mexico, and Utah 
lacks authority to initiate custody proceedings or enter custody orders so long as 
proceedings are pending there. As set forth above, Mexico retains continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction · over the custody of the children because it was the "home state" · of the 
children when the parties commenced their initial custody proceeding and because-Father 
continues to reside there. Moreover, the UCCJEA is clear that · 
a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this 
chapter if at the time of the commencement of the proceeding 
a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been 
previously commenced in a court of another state having 
jurisdiction substantially in conformity_ with this chapter, 
unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the 
court· of the other state because a court of this state is a more 
convenient forum .... 
UTAH CODE§ 78B-13-206(1). 
The February 8, 2013 order revoked Mother's prior temporary custodial rights and 
directed the parties to continue pursuing the custody issues reserved in their bifurcated 
decree before the appropriate "Citizen Judge" in Mexico. Certainly, this contemplates 
ongoing custody proceedings in the family courts of Mexico. 
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Equally important are the ongoing criminal charges , and extradition proceedings 
against Mother for the crime of Child Trafficking .. The UCCJEA defines "child custody 
proceeding" as "a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or parent-time 
with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for.divorce, separation, 
neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship; paternity, termination of parental rights, and 
protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear." Id 78B-13-102(4) 
( emphasis added). Irrespective of Mother's inaccurate characterizations of the divorce 
proceedings, criminal charges of Child Trafficking have been pending against Mother in 
. the Thirteenth District Court of Federal Penal Process for the Federal District in case 
number 85/2012, since authorities. confirmed that she illegally fled Mexico with the 
children. Mother fails to acknowledge that the criminal case for Child Trafficking is a 
custody proceeding under the UCCJEA, and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
entertain simultaneous proceedings until such criminal charges are resolved. The 
threshold inquiry of such charges is whether Mother has the right to legal or physical 
custody of the children. As indicated above, if convicted, Mother's parental rights are 
likely to be terminated. (R.92, 102, 403, 505.) 
The punishment for the crime of Child Trafficking committed by a parent in 
Mexico is termination of parental rights and up to five years of prison. (R.92, 370, 403, 
"-•.-
505, 562.) Upon this basis, Mother already attempted to challenge her criminal charges in 
Mexico as being cruel and unusual punishment in Mexico in the Eighth Criminal Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, in appellate case number 7/2014, and in the Mexico 
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Supreme'Court, in appellate case number 169/2014. (R.617:.756.) All ofher'Claims have 
been :rejected, and Mother has now been extradited. 
At the very heart of the Child Trafficking criminal case is a determination of 
Mother's legal and physical custody rights over the parties' minor children:. Should the 
Mexican 'courts determine that her actions warrant criminal sanctions, her parental rights 
will likely be terminated. Under the UCCJEA, these are child custody determinations 
reached through child custody proceedings. See also, In re BabyE.Z., 2011 UT 38~ ,r,r 16-
17 (defining "custody·. proceeding" under UCCJEA's federal parallel, the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, as broadly including any· proceeding 
regarding "actual possession and control of a child" or that "divests a natural parent of all 
parental rights, including the rights of custody"). Consequently, Utah lacks the authority 
to conduct simultaneous child custody proceedings until-at the very least-Mother's 
Child Trafficking criminal charges are finally resolved. 
Moreover, Mother confounds the inter-jurisdictional analysis of the UCCJEA 
when she points to subsequent cases with varying case numbers and assigned judicial 
officers as probative of her argument that Mexico was somehow divested of its exclusive,' 
continuing jurisdiction by her· illegal flight to Utah. See Br. of Appellant 7, 11-12 ,r 15 
n.3, 30. Child custody jurisdiction is not contingent upon on the administrative 
assignment of case numbers or judges. Rather the UCCJEA speaks in terms of 
jurisdiction vesting in a state and the courts of a state. Just as Utah does not lose 
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over an initial determination made in juvenile where 
modification· proceedings are assigned a different domestic commissioner, judge, and 
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case number in district court, Mexico has not lost its. continu{ng exclusive jurisdiction to 
maintain custody and/or modification proceedings simply because of judicial assignments 
or subsequent case numbers. 
As an apparent half-hearted, afterthought Mother now cla.ims that the district court 
should ha':'e communicated .with Mexican courts under Utah Code section 78B-13-206. 
Her entire claim is buried in a single clause of an introductory sentence to the 
memorandum supporting her Rule 52/59 motion to amend. (R.946.) This is not sufficient 
to preserve the issue for appeal. Even so, where another state's proceedings were 
"'commenced substantially in conformity with the jurisdictional requirements of [the 
jurisdictional statute] ... the communication requirement of [ the simultaneous prnceedings 
statute] has no application." Meyeres v. Meyers, 2008 UT App 364, ,r 6, 196 P.3d 604, 
608 (alterations in original) (quoting Arjona v. Torres, 941 So. 2d 451, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006)). Instead, "the language of the statute clearly states that the Utah court must 
make the decision of whether another state's court has such jurisdiction." Meyeres, 2008 
UT App 364, ,r6. 
There are ongoing child custody proceedings regarding the parties~ children in 
Mexico that prevent Utah courts from exercising simultaneous jurisdiction. 
Consequently, this Court must affirm the dismissal of Mother's petition here . 
. III. Mother's Unjustifiable Conduct Proscribes Utah's Exercise of Jurisdiction. 
To the extent that Utah could exercise jurisdiction over custody proceedings, it 
must decline and avoid assisting Mother in her unjustifiable conduct. "[l]f a court of this 
state has jurisdiction under this chapter because a person invoking the jurisdiction has 
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jurisdiction over a custody matter. "Courts have a sua sponte obligation 'to carefully 
consider the propriety of their , own jurisdiction." Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of 
Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75,, 26, 289 P.3d 582, 588. 
Mother goes to great lengths arguing that Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, 987 P .2d 
36, · stands for the opposite of its actual holding. One of the clear holdings of Spoons is 
that the "conversion" rule found in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12 - providing that 
motions under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) niay be treated like Rule 56 motions for 
summary judgment if affidavits or other papers outside the pleadings are submitted -
does not apply to motions under Rule 12(b)(l) to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Mother blithely argues that Spoons barred the domestic commissioner and 
district court from "weighing" the affidavits and documents presented with a 12(b)(l) 
motion, but Spoons says nothing of the sort. Rather, this Court has expressly made clear 
that when considering a 12(b )(1) motion, trial courts "may appropriately consider 
materials outside the pleadings ... " Myers v. Utah Transit Auth., 2014 UT App 294,, 13 
n.2, 341 P.3d 935, 939 n.2. When reviewing a trial court's decision respecting a 12(b)(l) 
motion, "we consider the 'facts alleged in the complaint, 'supplemented where appropriate 
· by the materials obtained through discovery·"' Id. (internal citations omitted); see also 
Gardner v. SPX Corp., 2012 UT App 45, , 9, 272 P.3d 175, 178 ("Trial courts may 
determine jurisdiction on affidavits alone ... ") (internal citations omitted). 
As it is, the trial court in this matter did not "weigh" competing affidavits against 
each other. Rather, the trial court reviewed a number of undisputed court orders from 
Mexico as well as the undisputed order from Utah's federal district court to reach the only 
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reasonable concl.usion arising therefrom: Mexico's judicial system already had ,issued 
custody and support orders, thus preempting jurisdiction in Utah. 
Each court that has had jurisdiction to address. the issue has found Father to be 
credible and genuinely concerned for his children. (R.51-52, 96, 124, 370.) Despite 
Mother's repeated and fantastic accusations of abuse, there exists no evidence or finding 
to support her claims. Father is anxious to confront such issues before a court properly 
exercising jurisdiction to consider them. Meanwhile, Mother has attempted to frustrate 
the jurisdiction of the family and criminal courts of Mexico at every turn, and she .has 
continued to actively and intentionally alienate Father and victimize their children-to a 
degree well beyond. that characteristic of a contested domestic case. Simply put, Mother's 
conduct is not only unjustifiable, it is criminal, and Utah must decline any exercise of 
jurisdiction that would condone it. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah lacks child custody subject matter jurisdiction in this case and Utah courts 
may not conduct proceedings simulta~eously to those of Mexico. Moreover, Mother's 
unjustifiable and criminal conduct proscribes any exercise of child custody jurisdiction in 
Utah. The Court should deny Mother's appeal in toto, and affirm the trial court's decision. 
DATED this 30th day of December, 2015. 
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Tab A 
§ 788-13-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 788-13-102 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 13. Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement (Refs & Annos) 
Part 1. General Provisions 
As used in this chapter: 
U.C.A 1953 § 78B-13-102 
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-45c-102 
§ 78B-13-102. Definitions 
Currentness 
(1) "Abandoned" means left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision. 
(2) "Child" means an individual under 18 years of age and not married. 
(3) "Child custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical 
custody, or parent-time with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order. The 
term does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual. 
( 4) "Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, or parent-time with respect to a 
child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, 
termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The term does not include 
a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement under Part 3, Enforcement. 
(5) "Commencement" means the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding. 
(6) "Court" means an entity authorized under the law of a state to establish, enforce, or modify a child custody determination. 
(7) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive 
months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of 
age, the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary 
absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period. 
(8) "Initial determination" means the first child custody determination concerning a particular child. 
(9) "Issuing court" means the court that makes a child custody determination for which enforcement is sought under this chapter. 
(10) "Issuing state" means the state in which a child custody determination is made. 
WestlawNext· © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
§ 78B-13-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 78B-13-102 
(11) "Modification" means a child custody determination that changes, replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a 
previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the previous determination. 
(12) "Person" includes gov~rnment, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial 
entity. 
(13) "Person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, who: 
(a) has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for a period of six consecutive months, including any 
temporary absence, within one year immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding; and 
(b) has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to legal custody under the law of this state. 
(14) "Physical custody" means the physical care and supervision of a child. 
(15) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any 
territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
(16) "Tribe" means an Indian tribe, or band, or Alaskan Native village which is recognized by federal law or formally 
acknowledged by a state. 
(17) "Writ of assistance" means an order issued by a court authorizing law enforcement officers to take physical custody of 
a child. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1268, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Notes of Decisions (6) 
U.CA. 1953 § 78B-13-102, UT ST§ 78B-13-102 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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Tab B 
§ 788-13-201. lr:iitial child custody jurisdiction, UT ST§ 78B-13-201 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 13. Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Jurisdiction 
U.C.A 1953 § 78B-13-201 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-45c-201 
§ 78B-13-201. Initial child custody jurisdiction 
Currentness 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78B-13-204, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody 
determination only if: 
(a) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the 
child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or 
person acting as a parent continues to live in this state; 
(b) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a), or a court of the home state of the child has 
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under Section 78B-13-207 or 
78B-13-208; and 
(i) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent have a significant 
connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and 
(ii) substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; 
( c) all courts having jurisdiction under Subsection (1 )( a) or (b) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court 
of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under Section 78B-13-207 or 78B-13-208; or 
(d) no state would have jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) Subsection (1) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this state. 
(3) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is neither necessary nor sufficient to make a child 
custody determination. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1279, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
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Tab C 
§ 788-13-202. Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, UT ST§ 78B-13-202 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 13. Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Jurisdiction 
U.C.A 1953 § 78B-13-202 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-45c-202 
§ 78B-13-202. Exclusive, continuing liilrisdiction 
Currentness 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78B-13-204, a court of this state that has made a child custody determination 
consistent with Section 78B-13-201 or 78B-13-203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until: 
(a) a court of this state determines that neither the child, the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent 
have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the 
child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or 
(b) a court ofthis state or a court of another state determines that neither the child, nor a parent, nor any person acting as 
a parent presently resides in this state. 
(2) A court of this state that has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if 
the court determines that it is an inconvenient forum under Section 78B-13-207. 
(3) A court of this state that has made a child custody determinaticiil and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under 
this section may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under Section 78B-13-201. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1280, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Notes of Decisions (11) 
U.CA. 1953 § 78B-13-202, UT ST§ 78B-13-202 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
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§ 78B-13-203. Jurisdiction to modify determination, UT ST§ 78B-13-203 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 13. Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Jurisdiction 
U.C.A 1953 § 78B-13-203 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-45c-203 
§ 78B-13-203. Jurisdiction to modify determination 
Currentness 
Except as otherwise provided in Section 78B-13-204, a court of this state may not modify a child custody determination 
made by a court of another state unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under Subsection 
78B-13-201(1)(a) or (b) and: 
(1) the court of the other state determines ,it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under Section 78B-13~202 or that 
a court of this state would be a more convenient forum under Section 78B-13-207; or 
(2) a court of this state or a court of the other state determines that neither the child, nor a parent, nor any person acting as a 
parent presently resides in the other state. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1281, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Notes of Decisions (2) 
U.CA.1953 § 78B-13-203, UT ST§ 78B-13-203 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
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Tab E 
§ 78B-13-206. Simultaneous proceedings, UT ST§ 78B-13-206 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 13. Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Jurisdiction 
U.C.A 1953 § 78B-13-206 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-45c-206 · 
§ 78B-13-206. Simultaneous proceedings 
Currentness 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78B-13-204, a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter 
if at the time of the commencement of the proceeding a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been previously 
commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the proceeding 
has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum under 
Section 78B-13-207. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78B-13-204, a court of this state, before hearing a child custody proceeding, 
shall examine the court documents and other ,information supplied by the parties pursuant to Section 78B-13-209. If the 
court determines that a child custody proceeding was previously commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction 
substantially in accordance with this chapter, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of 
the other state. If the court of the state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this chapter does not determine that 
the court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the proceeding. 
(3) In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a court of this state shall determine whether a proceeding to enforce 
the determination has been commenced in another state. If a proceeding to enforce a child custody determination has been 
commenced in another state, the court may: 
(a) stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of a court of the other state enforcing, staying, denying, 
or dismissing the proceeding for enforcement; 
(b) enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforcement; or 
(c) proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appropriate. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1284, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Notes of Decisions (8) 
U.CA. 1953 § 78B-13-206, UT ST§ 78B-13-206 
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Tab F 
§ 78B-13-208. Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct, UT ST§ 78B-13-208 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 13. Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Jurisdiction 
U.C.A.1953 § 78B-13-208 
Formerly cited as UT ST§ 78-45c-208 
§ 78B-13-208. Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct 
Currentness 
. . . 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78B-13-204 or by other law of this state, if a court of this state has jurisdiction 
under this chapter because a person invoking the jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to 
exercise its jurisdiction unless: 
(a) the parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction; 
(b) a court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under Sections 78B-13-201 through 78B-13-203 determines that this 
state is a more appropriate forum under Section 78B-13-207; or 
(c) no other state would have jurisdiction under Sections 78B-13-201 through 78B-13-203. 
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection (1), it may fashion an appropriate remedy 
to ensure the safety of the child and prevent a repetition of the wrongful conduct, including staying the proceeding until a child 
custody proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction under Sections 78B-13-201 through 78B-13-203. 
(3) If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection 
(1), it shall charge the party invoking the jurisdiction of the court with necessary and reasonable expenses including costs, 
communication expenses, attorney fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the 
course of the proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the award would be clearly inappropriate. 
The court may not assess fees,_costs, or expenses against this state except as otherwise provided by law other than this chapter. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1286, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Notes of Decisions (1) 
U.CA. 1953 § 78B-13-208, UT ST§ 78B-13-208 
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End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
1/VestlawNexr © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 
Tab G 
§ 788-13-209. Information to be submitted to court, UT ST § 788-13-209 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 13. Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement (Refs &Annos) 
Part 2. Jurisdiction 
U.C.A 1953 § 78B-13-209 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-45c-209 
· § 78B-13-209. Information to be submitted to court 
Currentness 
(1) In a child custody proceeding, each party, in its first pleading or in an attached affidavit, shall give information, if reasonably 
ascertainable, under oath as to the child's present address, the places where the child has lived during the last five years, and 
the names and present addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived during that period. The pleading or affidavit 
shall state whether the party: 
(a) has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in any other proceeding concerning. the custody of or 
parent-time with the child and, if so, identify the court, the case number of the proceeding, and the date of the child custody 
determination, if any; 
(b) knows of any proceeding that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings for enforcement and proceedings 
relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identify the court 
and the case number and the nature of the proceeding; and 
(c) knows the names and addresses of any person not a party to the proceeding who has physical custody of the child or 
claims rights of legal custody or physical custody of, or parent-time with, the child and, if so, the names and addresses of 
those persons. 
(2) If the information required by Subsection ( 1) is not furnished, the court, upon its own motion or that of a party, may stay 
the proceeding until the information is furnished. 
(3) If the declaration as to any of the items described in Subsection (1) is in the affirmative, the declarant shall give additional 
-information under oath as required by the court. The court may examine the parties under oath as to details of the information 
furnished and other matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disposition of the case. 
( 4) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding in this or any other state that could affect the current 
proceeding. 
(5) If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health, safety, or liberty of a party or child would be put 
at risk by the disclosure of identifying information, that information shall be sealed and not disclosed to the other party or the 
public unless the court orders the disclosure to be made after a hearing in which the court takes into consideration the health, 
safety, or liberty of the party or child and determines that the disclosure is in the interest of justice. 
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310 P.3d 772 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, in the interest of Z.Z., S.Z., S.Z., 
R.Z., and J.Z., Persons Under Eighteen Years of Age. 
K.Z. and V.Z., Appellants, 
v. 
State of Utah, Appellee. 
No. 20110678-CA. Sept. 6, 2013. 
Synopsis 
Background: State brought proceeding to terminate mother 
and father's parental rights. The Eighth District Juvenile 
Court, Duchesne Department, Larry A. Steele, J., terminated 
parental rights. Mother and father appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: . 
[1] mother and father's brief relocation to Colorado 
with children following juvenile court's child custody 
determination did not divest the court of its exclusive, 
continuing jurisdiction, notwithstanding a post~relocation 
order terminating the case, and 
[2] denial of continuance that mother and father sought on day 
of trial due to out-of-state scheduling conflict did not violate 
due process. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes (10) 
[1] Appeal and Error 
[2] 
~ Review Dependent on Whether Questions 
Are of Law or of Fact 
Jurisdictional questions and questions of 
statutory interpretation are questions of law that 
an appellate court reviews for correctness. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Infants 
[3] 
[4] 
[5] 
' 
<ll)= Dependency, Permanency, and Rights 
Termination 
On review of a termination of parental rights, 
appellate court would accept the validity of 
the juvenile court's underlying factual findings, 
where the parents, as the appellants, did not 
challenge the findings, much less demonstrate 
that the findings were clearly erroneous. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Appeal and Error 
<ll)= Grant of new trial in general 
Appeal and Error 
~ Refusal of new trial 
Because a trial court has broad discretion to grant 
or deny a motion for a new trial, an appellate 
court will reverse only if there is no reasonable 
basis for the decision. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 59. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Infants 
<ll)= Questions considered 
Whether a parent has. been afford~d adequate 
due process in a parental rights termination 
proceeding is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
I Cases that cite this headnote 
Infants 
<©= Inter-jurisdictional iss.ues in general 
Infants 
~ Proceedings; effect of termination 
Juvenile court's order granting agency's motion 
to terminate child protection proceeding on 
grounds that parents and children had left state 
stripped that court only of exclusive continuing 
jurisdiction over parents and children. West's 
U.CA. § 78B-13-202(1)(b). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[6] Infants 
~ Inter-jurisdictional issues in general 
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[7] 
Mother and father's brief relocation to 
Colorado with children following juvenile 
court's child custody determination in shelter 
hearing did not divest the court of its 
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over its 
custody determination under Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(UCCJEA), notwithstanding the court's post-
relocation order which terminated the "custody 
and guardianship foster care case" with provision 
that court "retain jurisdiction in this matter," 
and, thus, the court had jurisdiction to enter 
order terminating parental rights, where children 
were lifelong Utah residents, court had warrants 
out for both parents, court had a long history 
of dealings with the parents, no court from 
another state was asserting jurisdiction, and 
no Utah court determined that no significant 
connection existed and that substantial evidence 
was unavailable. West's U.C.A. §§ 78B-13-
201(1)(a), 78B-13-202(1)(a, b). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Infants 
<? Inter-jurisdictional issues in general 
Infants 
~""" Proceedings; effect of termination 
Juvenile court's order terminating the "custody 
and guardianship foster care case" with provision 
that court "retain jurisdiction in this matter," 
which order was made after parents briefly 
left state with children following the court's 
custody determination in shelter hearing, was not 
a determination that the parents and children did 
not presently reside in the state, as would divest 
the court of exclusive, continuing jurisdiction 
over its custody determination under Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
(UCCJEA), and, thus, the court had jurisdiction 
to enter order terminating parental rights, where 
Department of Children and Family Services 
(DCFS) moved to terminate the case and 
represented in its motion that the family was 
in Colorado and being monitored by Colorado 
authorities, Department did not state that the 
courts of Colorado had become involved, much 
less that Colorado had obtained jurisdiction 
over the custody determination, and Department 
[8] 
[9] 
specifically asked the court to retain jurisdiction 
in the event that the family returned to Utah. 
West's U.C.A. § 78B-13-202(1)(a, b). 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Constitutional Law 
~ Removal or termination of parental rights 
Proceedings to terminate parental rights must 
comport with the requirements of due process. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
Infants 
P Notice and process 
Infants 
~ Presence of parties and counsel 
While parents are entitled to proper notice of 
termination of parental rights proceedings, there 
is no absolute statutory or constitutional right to 
attend the trial in child welfare matters, including 
termination proceedings. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
[10] Constitutional Law 
~ Removal or termination of parental rights 
Infants 
!@= Continuance 
Trial court's denial of mother's and father's last-
minute request for continuance so that they could 
. attend trial in their parental rights termination 
proceeding did not violate due process, where 
mother and father were properly provided notice 
of trial well before mother's criminal-related 
scheduling conflict arose in another state, mother 
had been on notice of the trial date for nearly four 
months, mother did not attempt to reschedule 
her criminal matter, and father's sole justification 
for missing trial apparently was that he was 
in attendance with mother in the criminal 
proceeding. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Rules 
Civ .Proc., Rule 59. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
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Attorneys and Law Firms 
*773 Marea A. Doherty and Herbert W. Gillespie, Attorneys 
for Appellants. 
John E. Swallow and John M. Peterson, Attorneys for 
Appellee. 
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem. 
*774 Judge GREGORY K. ORME authored this Amended 
Opinion, in which Judges STEPHEN L. ROTH and 
MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN concurred. 
Amended Opinion 1 
ORME, Judge: 
, 1 K.Z. (Father) and V Z. (Mother) appeal from an order of 
the juvenile court terminating their parental rights in their five 
children and from a subsequent order denying their motions 
for a new trial. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
, 2 The parents have an extensive history with the Utah 
juvenile court system and with the Utah Department of Child 
and Family Services (DCFS), dating as far back as 1997. 
They have had other children permanently removed from 
their custody in the past, 2 and DCFS has opened sixteen 
cases involving the parents over the years. We outline only 
the facts relevant to this appeal. 
, 3 DCFS filed a Motion for Expedited Placement and a 
Petition for Custody in July 2009, alleging that the parents 
were habitual users of illegal drugs 3 and that their children 
should be removed from their home. The parents were 
provided notice of the scheduled shelter hearing. Father was 
present at the hearing, but Mother failed to appear and a 
warrant was issued. At that time, the children were placed in 
the legal custody ofDCFS but were unable to be placed in its 
physical custody because their whereabouts were unknown. 
The next month, both parents failed to appear for a pretrial 
hearing. The warrant for Mother was continued in effect, 
and the issuance of a warrant for Father was taken under 
advisement. 
, 4 Two weeks later, the parents again failed to appear for a 
pretrial hearing. Counsel for Mother reported that he had been 
unable to make any contact with her. The warrant for Mother 
was left in effect, and a warrant for Father was issued. Late in 
2009, DCFS filed a motion to close the custody case because 
it had become aware that the parents had fled to Colorado 
with their children. 4 Given the thrust of the parents' appeal, 
the terms of dismissal are of pivotal significance. DCFS 
moved the court "to terminate the State of Utah's custody 
and guardianship custody case." The motion, while reciting 
that the family had moved to Colorado, specifically requested 
that the court "retain jurisdiction in this matter in the event 
the family return·s." The court granted the motion in January 
2010, ordering that "the custody and guardianship foster care 
case be terminated ... and that the Court retain jurisdiction in 
this matter." 
, 5 A few months later, four of the children were back in Utah. 
DCFS took them into protective custody in April 2010. At that 
time, DCFS spoke to Mother on the phone but she would not 
disclose the whereabouts of the fifth child. DCFS then filed 
a new verified petition, 5 and a shelter hearing was held later 
that month. The fifth child was located and taken into DCFS's 
custody in *775 May 2010. DCFS eventually served notice 
on the parents through publication, and Mother and Father 
were also both served with notice prior to the termination trial 
held in April 2011. 
, 6 Neither DCFS nor the juvenile court received any 
communication from the parents prior to the April 2011 
trial date. 6 On the morning of trial, the court received a 
faxed note from Mother's Colorado counsel stating that the 
parents would not appear for the termination trial because of 
a conflicting criminal hearing involving Mother in Colorado. 
The parents, through their Utah counsel, moved for a 
continuance at that time, which the juvenile court denied. 
, 7 The trial proceeded as scheduled, and the court entered 
an order on May 25, 2011, terminating the parents' parental 
rights. The parents filed motions for a new trial in June 2011. 
DCFS and the children's guardian ad litem objected on the 
basis that the parents had habitually failed to appear and did 
not request a continuance in advance of the actual day of trial. 
The juvenile court denied the motions for a new trial, and this 
appeal followed. 
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1] [2] ! 8 On appeal, the parents argue that the 
juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate 
their parental rights by reason of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), as 
enacted in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-13-101 to 
-318 (LexisNexis 2012). 7 "[J]urisdictional questions and 
questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law 
that we review for correctness." In re P.F.B., 2008 UT 
App 271, ! 10, 191 P.3d 49. We accept the validity of 
the juvenile court's underlying factual findings because the 
parents, as the appellants, have not challenged the juvenile 
court's findings, much less demonstrated that the findings are 
clearly erroneous. See In re JR., 2011 UT App 180, ! 2, 257 
P.3d 1043 (per curiam). 
[3] [4] ! 9 The parents also argue that the juvenile court 
violated their due process rights when it denied their motions 
for a new trial. "Because a trial court has broad discretion 
to grant or deny a motion for a new trial under rule 59 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, we will reverse only if 
there is no reasonable basis for the decision." In re Adoption 
of A.F.K., 2009 UT App 198, ! 17,216 P.3d 980 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). That said, "[w]hether 
a parent has been afforded adequate due process is a question 
of law, reviewed for correctness." In re J.B., 2002 UT App 
268, ! 7, 53 P.3d 968. 
ANALYSIS 
I.°Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
[5] ! 10 Section 78A--6-103 of the Utah Code vests the 
juvenile court with exclusive jurisdiction over all cases 
involving "a child who is an abused child, neglected child, 
or dependent child." Utah Code Ann. § 78A--6-103(l)(c) 
(LexisNexis 2012). Nonetheless, the parents' principal claim 
on appeal is that the juvenile court did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction to enter the order terminating their parental 
rights. The parents do not challenge the actions of the juvenile 
court leading up to January 2010 when the court, while 
specifically retaining its own jurisdiction, granted DCFS's 
motion to terminate the case. They argue, however, that the 
juvenile court, through its January 2010 order, "fulfill[ed], in 
its entirety, the conditions required to divest the juvenile court 
of exclusive ongoing jurisdiction, and thus subject matter 
jurisdiction in this matter." We disagree. 
[6] ! 11 As a threshold matter, we first note-and both 
parties agree-that the juvenile court properly exercised 
jurisdiction under *776 Utah Code section 78B-13-201 
when it held the shelter hearing and ordered the children 
into the custody of DCFS in July 2009. A juvenile court 
in this state "has jurisdiction to make an initial child 
custody determination" 8 if "this state is the home state 
of the child[ren] on the date of the commencement of 
the proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-13-20l(l)(a) 
(LexisNexis 2012). Because Utah was the children's home 
state when the proceeding commenced in July 2009, as it 
was at the earlier time when the Utah court made its initial 
custody determination as to some of the other children, see 
supra note 8, the juvenile court had exclusive, continuing 
jurisdiction over the custody determination it made at the 
July 2009 shelter hearing. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
13-202(1) (LexisNexis 2012). While Mother and Father 
do not deny that the juvenile court originally possessed 
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction when it made the July 2009 
determination, they assert that because they relocated with the 
children to Colorado after the July 2009 order was entered, 
Utah effectively ceased to be the proper forum in which to 
adjudicate their parental rights. They contend that DCFS's 
motion to terminate the custody case in December 2009 
confinned the impropriety of the juvenile court's continued 
jurisdiction after their move to Colorado and that the court's 
January 2010 order unequivocally divested the court of its 
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. 
! 12 If a court of this state has made a child custody 
determination consistent with section 201, the court has 
and retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over that 
determination until 
(a) a court of this state determines that neither the child, 
the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting 
as a parent have a significant connection with this state 
and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this 
state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships; or 
(b) a court of this state or a court. of another state determines 
that neither the child, nor a parent, nor any person acting as 
a parent presently resides in this state. 
Id.§ 78B-13-202(1)(a)--{b). Thus, the juvenile court retained 
jurisdiction over the July 2009 determination unless, as 
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the parents contend, one of the two determinations from 
subsection 202(1) was made prior to the April 2010 
proceedings. 
, 13 It is clear from the record that no court of this state 
had made a subsection 202(1)(a) determination prior to the 
April 2010 proceedings, and there was certainly no basis for 
doing so. These children are lifelong residents of Utah- save 
for their brief furlough in Colorado-and their parents have 
a lengthy and involved history with the Utah juvenile court 
system. The family's temporary retreat to Colorado did not 
eliminate the significant connection that both the children 
and the parents have with this state, nor did it diminish the 
"evidence ... available in this state concerning the child [ren]'s 
care, protection, training, and personal relationships." See id. 
§ 78B-13-202(l)(a). Most importantly, neither the juvenile 
court nor any other Utah court made a determination that no 
significant connection existed and that substantial evidence 
was unavailable. 
[7] , 14 The parents premise their primary argument 
on subsection 202(1)(b), claiming that the juvenile court's 
January 2010 order determined that "the Parents and Children 
·did not presently reside in this state." But a plain reading of 
DCFS's motion and the court's order shows that the juvenile 
court did nothing more than terminate the guardianship and 
custody case and retain its jurisdiction "in this matter." 
When Mother and Father took the children and headed for 
Colorado, DCFS could no longer provide services to the 
children and had no *777 reason to keep its case file 
open. Accordingly, DCFS moved to terminate the case and 
represented in its motion that the family was in Colorado 
and being monitored by Colorado authorities. DCFS did 
not, however, state that the courts of Colorado had become 
involved, much less that Colorado had obtained jurisdiction 
over the July 2009 determination. Nor did DCFS assert that 
Utah had lost jurisdiction. Instead, and notwithstanding its 
request that the case be terminated, DCFS specifically asked 
the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction in the event that the 
family returned to Utah. The clear import of the motion was 
not to concede that Utah had lost its exclusive, continuing 
jurisdiction but rather that DCFS wanted to close out its case 
file while leaving the door open for continued proceedings 
should any of the family members return to Utah. 
, 15 The parents seem to conflate the representations made in 
DCFS's motion with the juvenile court's order. The order-
·all four lines of it-did not adopt any of DCFS's statements 
as findings, and, critically, did not make a determination 
that "neither [a] child, nor a parent ... resides in this state." 
See id. § 78B-13-202(l)(b). Instead, it merely ordered 
that the "custody and guardianship foster care case be 
terminated", while expressly providing that ."the Court retain 
jurisdiction in this matter." From all that appears, then, 
the court simply terminated the case for the administrative 
convenience of DCFS while expressly retaining its own 
jurisdiction over the outstanding July 2009 determination for 
potential future modifications. Given that there is nothing in 
the record to indicate that a court of another state made a 
determination that qualifies as one made under subsection 
202(1 )(b), we conclude that no determination was made under 
subsection 202(1) and that the juvenile court consequently 
retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the July 
2009 determination. Thus, the juvenile court's jurisdiction 
was not ended by operation of law and, especially given 
that jurisdiction was expressly retained by the court, its 
jurisdiction remained in full force and effect. 
, 16 The juvenile court's retention of jurisdiction here is both 
proper and fully consistent with the scheme and philosophy 
of the UCCJEA. As explained in the official comment, 
"Jurisdiction attaches at the commencement of a proceeding. 
If State A had jurisdiction under this section at the time 
a modification proceeding was commenced there, it would 
not be lost by all parties moving out of the State prior to 
the conclusion of [the] proceeding." Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act § 202 cmt. (1997). Thus, 
an uncooperative set of parents cannot unilaterally divest the 
court of its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction by fleeing to 
another state during the pendency of a custody proceeding. 
See id. And along largely parallel lines, a court does not divest 
itself of jurisdiction when it allows DCFS to close out a case 
that lies dormant-albeit still alive and jurisdictionally sound 
-merely because the family absconded to another state. 
This is especially true where, as here, the court explicitly 
retains jurisdiction in its dismissal order. Were the law 
otherwise, conniving parents could easily render a custody 
proceeding null and void, and consequently destroy a court's 
jurisdiction, by rounding up their children and hightailing 
it to a neighboring state. The purposes and goals of the 
UCCJEA would be nearly impossible to accomplish because 
they would be subject to and entirely contingent upon the 
whims of parents and their level of willingness to be bound 
by the orders of a court properly possessing and exercising 
jurisdiction. Such a system would be untenable, and we 
decline to adopt a view of the statute that allows parents to 
unilaterally upend a court's proper exercise of jurisdiction by 
leaving the state while a proceeding is pending. 
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! 17 Finally, we emphasize that the April 2010 proceedings 
and subsequent termination of Mother's and Father's parental 
rights logically followed and were built upon the juvenile 
court's July 2009 determination. As previously stated, the 
court did not vacate the July 2009 determination in its January 
2010 dismissal order, and there was no reason to do so. The 
court had warrants out for both parents, it had a long history of 
dealings with the parents, and no court from another state was 
asserting jurisdiction. When the children resurfaced in Utah 
after their brief absence, both the court and DCFS simply 
*778 pulled the same case off the shelf and picked up where 
things had left off, 9 with DCFS getting physical custody of 
the children and the case eventually culminating in the court's 
decision to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights. 
! 18 A court of this state that has made a custody 
determination consistent with Utah Code section 78B-13-
201(1) maintains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over that 
determination unless a subsequent determination is made 
pursuant to section 78B-13-202(1). See Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-13-202(1)(a)--(b) (LexisNexis 2012). We conclude that 
the juvenile court retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction 
over its July 2009 determination and that no determination 
under subsection 202(1) was made prior to the April 2010 
proceedings. And of course none was made thereafter. 
We further conclude that a court does not divest itself of 
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction when it expressly retains 
jurisdiction in an order dismissing a pending case that can no 
longer be effectively managed because the parents relocate 
to another state before the matter can be resolved. Because 
the juvenile court's order expressly retained jurisdiction over 
the July 2009 determination and because that retention is 
consistent with the policies and terms of the UCCJEA, the 
court's exercise of jurisdiction over the parents from the· April 
2010 proceedings onward was every bit as appropriate as was 
the jurisdiction it exercised in the summer of 2009. 
II. Due Process 
! 19 The parents argue that they were denied their due process 
rights when the April 2011 trial was conducted despite their 
absence. They contend that the juvenile court abused its 
discretion when it denied their motions for a new trial. · 
and internal quotation marks omitted). This right, however, 
is not boundless. The parents concede that "the juvenile 
court had no duty to ensure a parent's presence at a 
termination trial." While the parents were entitled to proper 
notice of the proceedings, "there is no absolute statutory 
or constitutional right to attend the trial" in child welfare 
matters, including termination proceedings. See id. (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). This court has held, 
in the context of a criminal sentencing hearing, that "[n]otice 
of the proceedings is alone sufficient to allow a defendant to 
exercise the right to be present by appearing, or to waive that 
right through voluntary absence." State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT 
App 241,! 12, 31 P.3d615,aff'd, 2003 UT46, 79 P.3d 937. 
[10] ! 21 The parents contend that they-especially Mother 
-were prevented from attending the April 2011 trial and 
should have been granted a continuance on the morning of 
trial. They ignore the fact that they were properly provided 
notice of the trial well before Mother's scheduling conflict 
arose in Colorado. Father's counsel accepted service on his 
behalf, and Mother was served in open court in Utah during a 
January 2011 pretrial hearing. The parents do not contest that 
they were provided notice and fail to explain how they were 
prevented from seeking a continuance in a timely fashion 
rather than on the very morning of their termination trial. 
! 22 The circumstances of this case are even less compelling 
than the facts in In re A .E., where we found a similar argument 
to be unpersuasive: 
[AE.'s father] argues that because he was incarcerated and, 
therefore, not a free agent, the juvenile court had a duty to 
either assure his presence at trial, or not hold the trial in 
his absence. However, [AE.'s father] has failed to show us 
how he exercised due diligence in attempting to be present 
for all stages of the trial, but was prevented from appearing 
by circumstances over which he had no control. 
2001 UT App 202, ! 16, 29 P.3d 31 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). *779 Mother failed to submit 
any proof to the juvenile court indicating that she even 
attempted to reschedule her Colorado matter. And as noted, 
Mother failed to inform the Utah juvenile court of the conflict 
until the very morning of trial, even though she had been 
on notice of the trial date for nearly four months. Father's 
sole justification for missing the trial appears to be that "he 
was in attendance with [Mother] in the Colorado criminal 
[8] [9] ! 20 "Proceedings to terminate parental rights proceeding." Therefore, both Mother and Father failed to 
must comport with the requirements of Due Process." In 
re A.E., 2001 UT App 202, ! 14, 29 P.3d 31 (citation 
show that they exercised any semblance of due diligence in 
attempting to be present for the termination trial in Utah or at 
Westlavv~,Je:,:r © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 
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least to seek a continu_ance in a timely manner. 10 Because we 
conclude that Mother's and Father's due process rights were 
not violated, it follows that the juvenile court did not err in 
denying the parents' motions· for a new trial. 11 
CONCLUSION 
, 23 The Utah juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction 
when it made the July 2009 custody determination. The 
family's subsequent relocation to Colorado did not divest 
the court of its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the 
July 2009 determination. Moreover, the court's January 
2010 order closed the case only to the extent that it 
temporarily ended DCFS's involvement, but the court did not 
lose jurisdiction over the July 2009 determination and the 
July 2009 proceedings were not extinguished. Accordingly, 
Footnotes 
the court's exercise of jurisdiction during the April 2010 
proceedings and continuing on through its termination of 
Mother's and Father's parental rights was appropriate. 
, 24 Additionally, the juvenile court did not err in denying the 
parents' motions for a new trial. The parents were not denied 
due process when the court rejected their request for a last 
minute continuance and conducted the trial in their absence. 
, 25 Affirmed. 
Judges STEPHEN L. ROTH and MICHELE M. 
CHRISTIANSEN concurred. 
All Citations 
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1 This Amended Opinion supersedes the court's November 8, 2012 Opinion in this matter. That Opinion is hereby vacated 
and is of no force, effect, or precedential value. 
2 
3 
The parents' rights to another child they had together were terminated earlier. During the investigation involving that child, 
three children that Mother had with a man other than Father were removed and placed with their biological father. 
DCFS alleged that Mother used methamphetamine and that Father took unprescribed controlled medication. Additionally, 
DCFS claimed that there were two other drug users living in the home with the parents and the children. 
4 The parents characterize this as a routine relocation. "Fled" is the term used by the juvenile court in its findings of fact 
entered on May 25, 2011. On appeal, the parents have not challenged the juvenile court's findings. 
5 The new petition and all subsequent pleadings and orders employed the same case numbers as were used in the 
proceeding commenced in 2009-the same case numbers as had been used in prior cases involving this family. As 
recounted in the findings of fact, the new petition "alleg[ed] the same facts as the July 2009 petition and alleg[ed] that the 
parents had fled from the State of Utah with the children after the Court had placed the children in the State's custody in 
July of 2009." Given the arguments advanced by the parents on appeal, it is noteworthy that the juvenile court's findings 
recite matter-of-factly that "[t]he instant case began on July 21, 2009." 
6 The parents have been effectively and diligently represented by their counsel. Despite the absence of their clients, both 
counsel attended a pretrial hearing on April 28, 2010. At a further pretrial hearing in May, both parents were absent but, 
again, both counsel were present. Counsel raised a concern about notice to the parents, and the court continued the 
trial to a later date. 
7 Because no material amendments have been made to the relevant statutes since the events in issue, we cite the most 
current version of the code as a convenience to the reader. 
8 It appears from the record that the July 2009 determination was the initial child custody determination, as that term is 
defined by the statute, for the two youngest children involved here, but it was not the initial custody determination for 
the older three. See Utah Code Ann. § 788-13-102(8) (LexisNexis 2012) (" 'Initial determination' means the first child 
custody determination concerning a particular child."). As to the older three children, the July 2009 determination was a 
subsequent modification of a prior initial custody determination over which the court had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction 
under section 788-13-202. See id.§ 788-13-202(1). 
9 DCFS did file a new petition to bring the matter back before the court, but the new petition "alleg[ed] the same facts as 
the July 2009 petition" and the juvenile court considered it as part of the same "case [that] began on July 21, 2009." 
See supra note 5. 
West[awNexr © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 
State in Interest of Z.Z., 31 O P .3d n2 (2013) 
742 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2013 UT App 215 
1 O The parents argue that we should extend State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P .3d 615, aff'd, 2003 UT 46, 79 P .3d 
937, to parental termination proceedings. Such an extension would do them no good, as the rationale of Wanosik is 
inapplicable because the reason for the parents' absence in this case was not unknown. See id. ,i 21. 
11 Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that the parents' due process rights were violated, 
[t]he appellate court will only find prejudicial error, after a review of the record demonstrates that there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the [parents]. [W]e must review the record and determin_e whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the termination hearing would have been more favorable to [the 
parents] had the juvenile court not [committed the due process violation]. 
In re J.B., 2002 UT App 268, ,i 9, 53 P.3d 968 (third alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). The extensive evidence against the parents and their prior history with •CFS strongly suggest that the result 
of the trial would have been no different had the parents attended the termination trial, and they have not demonstrated 
the likelihood of a more favorable outcome. 
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
JUAN PABLO MATAS-VIDAL, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEY· 
AGUILERA (aka Brooke Robinson), 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OFF ACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 2:l3CV422 DAK 
This matter is before the court on Juan Pablo Matas~Vidal's ("Petitioner" or .. Mr. Matas,; 
Vidal") Petition for Immediate Return of Children to Petitioner Pursuant to the Hague 
Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act ("!CARA"). Tbe court 
initially set a bearing ou the Petition for June 18, 2013. At that hearing, however, Respondent 
Susan Consuelo Libbey-Aguilera, also known as Brooke Robinson ("Respondent" or ''Ms. 
Libbey-Aguilera"), who is the motlier ofthe children, requested that the court continue the 
bearing to allow her to obtain counsel and to respond to the Petition. The court then rescheduled 
the hearing for June 28, 2013, and the hearing took place on that date. At the hearing, Petitioner 
was represented by David S. Dolowitz and James M. HUMicutt. Respondent was represented by 
Clayton A. Simms and Staci Visser. 
Prior fo June 28, 2013 hearing, the court carefully reviewed the Petition, tbe Response to 
the Petition (tbe "Response Brief"), and all affidavits and exhibits that had been provided to the 
court. At the June 28, 2013 hearing, Petitioner requested an opportwlity to reply to Ms. Libbey-
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Aguilera's Response,:which.ltad been filed the evening before the hearing. Petitioner's reply (the 
"Reply Brief') was filed on July 19, 2013.1 The court has now carefully reviewed the Reply 
Brief: along with all exhibits accompanying the brief.2 Now, having carefully considered all of 
the evidence subtnitted, along wid1 tl1e relevant authorities on tlle legal issues presented, d1e court 
renders tlte following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. GENERAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioner claims that his ex-wife wrongfully removed the parties' two minor children, 
· SM-L and RM-L, fro_m their habitual residence in Mexico City, Mexico, in December 20 l 0 or 
January 2011. He contends that Respondent wilfully disobeyed die orders of the Mexican Court, 
which bad given him custody rights and had prohibited Ms. Libbey-Aguilera from removing the 
couple's children from their habitual residence in Mexico. Petitioner further argues that 
Respondent's allegat,ions of domestic violence are untrue and were fabricated long after the 
divorce proceedings ~o alienate the children from him. He contends that Respondent, after 
removing the children to the United States, bid the children from him by having her name 
chauged through a court proceeding in the state of Idaho and by changing the names of their 
minor children in their school records. Petitioner asks Ibis court lo return the children to Mexico 
City so that the custody issues may be resolved there. 
. . 
1 The court initially set a deadline of July 12, 2013, but the parties stipulated to a one-
week extension. until July 19, 2013, and the court penuitted the extension. · · 
2 The coUt1 has also considered Respondent's Corrections to Respondent's Exbibits 
(Docket No. 33), Petitioner's Response to the Corrections (Docket No. 34), and a letter from tbe 
social worker who has recently met with the children. See Sealed Docket No. 35. 
2 
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Respondent, however, contends that the Mexican court had awarded her sole custody and 
had dissolved the orders preventing her from leaving Mexico. Therefore, she argues, she did not 
wrongfully remove the children from Mexico. She also claims that she and the children were 
victims of domestic violence at the hands of Petilio1ier, which is why she fled Mexico. Sbe has 
asserted several reasons why the children should not be sent back to Mexico. 
B. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This action bas been broutwt pursuaut to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction (the "Hague Convention" or the "Convention"), which bas been 
implemented in the United States by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act 
("!CARA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610. The Hague Convention was adopted to protect children 
from the adverse effects of being wrongfully removed to or retained in a foreign country and to 
establish procedures for their return. See Oblander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 153 l~ 1534 (101h Cir. 
1997) (citing the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Dec. 
23, 1981, Preamble, 51 Fed Reg. 10494. 10,498 (1986)). "The Convention is meant to provide 
for a child's prompt return once it bas been established the child has been •wrongfully removed' 
to or retained in any affiliated state." Id. (quoting Convention, art. 1). The court's role is not to 
. . . 
make traditional custody decisions but to determine in what jurisdiction the children should be 
physically located so that the proper jurisdiction can make tbose custody decisions. Loos v. 
Manuel.651 A.2d 1077 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994); see also Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 
F.3d 1060, 1063 (611lCir. 1996). 
3 
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II. HISTORY OF CASE 
Petitioner filed the instant action on Ilme 7, 2013. At the same time, he filed a Motion 
for a Temporary Restraining Order, Order to Show Cause, Writ of Assistance, and Request for 
Immediate Return ofMirior Children (the "Motion for a TRO"). On June 7, 2013, the court 
granted the Motion for a TRO and entered an Order (the "June 7, 2013 Order''), which, among 
other things, prohibited Ms. Libbey-Aguilera from interfering with the children being taken into 
prot~tive custody. 3 The June 7, 2013 Order also stated that the court would hold an immediate 
hearing after the Order was setved to detenniue whether the court should order the return of the 
children to Petitioner 1to allow him to immediately return with them to Mexico.4 
On June 14, ~O 13, the United States of America filed an Emergency Motion to Inteivene, . 
Reqi1est for Stay of Temporary Restraining Order and Hearing? The reason for United States' 
motion was tl1at the United States believed there was a conflict between this court's June 7, 2013 
Order and a previous Order entered by a Magistrate Judge of this cowt in a criminal Extradition 
proceeding involving Respondent.6 In the motion, the United States explained that the 
Government of Mexico had asked the United States, through diplomatic channels, for the 
provisional arrest of Ivis. Libbey-Aguilera for the purpose of ex.tradition for her alleged 
. . 
perpetration of Child Trafficking under Mexican law. Pursuant to an Birest warrant signed by a 
3 See Docket No. 5 
-1 Id 
5 Docket No. 6. 
. 
6 The Extradition proceeding is Case No. 2: l 3MJ15 l. A probable cause hearing has 
been set for August 12, 2013. 
4 
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Magistrate Judge on May 9, 2013, Ms. Libbey-Aguilera had been arrested, and an initial 
appearance had been held on May 10, 2013. The Magistrate Judge ordered, among other things, 
that {l) Ms. Libbey-Aguilera wear a GPS ankle monitor, report to pretrial seivices daily, and 
maintain her CU1Tent residence; and (2) the _two minor c~!_dre~-were to remain with Ms. Libbey-
_._ ·. _-;_.._ ·--~~. --,, ·~- .. 
Aguilera at her residence;1 and (3) the passports ofMs. Libbey-Aguilera and her children be 
turned over 1o pretrial services; and that ( 4) Ms. Libbey-Aguilera and the minor children were not 
to leave the state witl1out the permission of the Court. 8 Accordingly, the United States asked this 
cow.t for pennission to intervene in the instant case and also to stay the proceeding.9, including 
the court's Order dated June 7, 2013 until such time as the court could hold a hearing to address 
. 
the apparent conflict in the two Orders. On June 17, 2013, the court set a hearing for June 18, 
2013. 
The apparent conflict in the two court Orders had prevented the Orem Police Department 
from contacting the Department of Child and Family Services ("DCSF"). Todd Gabler, a private 
investigator in the State of Utah Department of Public Safety, who was working with Petitioner, 
infonned the court, through an affidavit filed on June 18, 2013, that, on June 13, 2013, be had 
served a copy of this Court's June 7, 2013 Order on the Orem Police Department." At that time, 
- - . 
he bad asked the officers to contact him when the Order was to be served on Ms. Libbey-· 
7 The United States maintained that this court's June 7, 2013 Order directing the minor 
children to be taken into protective custody was in conflic1 with the Magistrate Judge's Ordet· fo1· 
the children to remain with Ms. Aguilera. -
8 See Case No. 2: 13MJ1S 1, Docket No. 6, Order Setting Conditions of Release at 2. 
9 See Docket No. 8. 
s 
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Aguilera. He also sei;ved II copy of the Order on Ms. Libbey-Aguilera on June Hi, 2013. He 
stated in bis Affidavit that, moments after serving Ms. Libbey-Aguilera with the Order, the Orem 
Police Department r~ponded to Ms. Libbey•Aguilera•s residence, and he gave the officers 
another copy of the Order. According to Mr. Gabler, the officers refused to contact DCFS fo 
pick up the children. as .directed by the Jw1e 7 Order, because Ms. Libbey-Aguilera had produced 
the Magistrate Judge's Order, which she claimed required her to keep the children with her at 
her place ofresidence.10 
During the June 18, 2013 hearing, the comt permitted the United States to intervene for 
the pwpose of pointing out the apparent conflict between this cowt's J1me 7 Order and the 
Magistrate Judge's Order Setting Conditions of Release in the Extradition proceeding. At the 
June 18, 2013 hearing, Ms. Libbey-Aguilera was not represented by counsel, but counsel who 
had been appointed pursuant to tbe Criminal Justice Act ("CJA") to represent her in her criminal 
' ' . 
Extradition proceed~g, Clayton Simms, appem·ed as a friend of the court. He explained that Ms. 
Libbey-Aguilera had just been served with the actual Petition on that day and that she had not 
had 11I1 opportunity to find cowisel to represent her. Mr. Simms requested that the court continue 
the hearing to allow Ms. Libbey-Aguile1·a time to find counsel. The court granted the request and 
continued the bearing untilJune 28, 2013. 
On June 21, 2013, Mr. Simms requested that, due to lbe time-sensitive nature of this 
proceeding and his ~iarity with the facts and circumstances of this case, be be appointed as 
l 
?v!s. Libbey•Aguilera's counsel in the instant matter because it is ancillacy to his CJA 
to Id. 
6 . 
,· 
' 
' 
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appointment in the Extradition matter. 11 The court granted the request. 12 
On June 24, 2013, Ms. Libbey-Aguilera filed a Motion to Appoint Guardian ad Litem 
("GAL,,) for the two children involved in this matter. 13 Mr. Matas-Vidal opposed the motion on 
June 25, 2013, and Ms. Libbey-Aguilera filed a Reply on June 26, 2013.14 Tbe court issued an 
Order on June 26, 2013, deferring ruling on the motion until after the June 28, 2013 hearing.u In 
the Order, the cowt explained that it intended to proceed with the scheduled June 28 hearing and 
that if it became apparent at the hearing tbat a GAL would be helpful to the court's 
detennination, the court would appoint one and hold a subsequent heai-ing.16 
At the J\We 28, 2013 hearing, the court beard argument from counsel on the merits of the 
Petition.11 At the hearing, the court also inquired about permitting Petitioner to see his children.18 
After some discussion among the parties, they agreed to arnwge a time and place for a supervised 
11 Docket No. 13. 
t:? Docket No. 14. 
13 Docket No. 15. 
1
-1 Docket Nos. 18, 19, respectively. 
1
~ Docket No. 21. 
16 Ultimately, the court did not find that the appointment of a GAL would be helpful to 
the court's resolution of this matter and has therefore never ordered that a GAL be appointed. 
n Af the hearing, Petitioner's counsel indicated that because Respondent's Response 
Brief and exhibits had been filed late on June 27, 2013, he bad not had time to thoroughly review 
everything or to respond to Ms. Libbey-Aguilera's arguments. He asked for an opportunity to 
file a reply to her response, and the court set a deadline of July 12, 2013 for the Reply Brief, 
which deadline was later extended, with permission of !he court, to July 19, 2013. 
18 Petitioner had sought to see his children at the initial June 12 hearing, but the cowt 
declined to order a visitation at that time. 
7 
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visit within tlie next ~ew days, while Mr. Matas-Vidal was still in tbe United States. 
Subsequently, because of the children's reluctance about seeing their father, the parties decided 
that the children should meet with a reunification therapist prior to their first meeting. 19 As of 
tbe date of this Order, it appears that the children have met at least twice with a therapist but have 
not yet visited with ilieir fatber.20 At the Jwie 28 hearing, the court also conducted an in camera 
' 
interview of each of the minor chil~en; without any attorneys present. 
III. FINDINGS OF FACT 
Petitioner and Respondent were married in Mexico City on June 26, 1999. Petitioner .is a 
Mexican national, and Respondent has dual citizenship iii Mexico and tbe United States, as her 
father was a United States citizen and her mother was a Mexican !=itizen. SM-L was bom in 
Mexico City in May 2001, and RM-L was born in Mexico City in November 2003. At some 
point when the childre11 were ve1y young, the couple discussed the possibility of moving to the 
United States, but that possibility never came to fruition because Petitioner could not find 
adequate-paying work in the United States. The children were granted United States citizenship 
I 
in 2005. In October 2006, Ms. Libbey-Aguilera purchased a condominium in San Antonio. 
Texas and sometim~ visited there. For tbe duration of their maniage, however, Petitioner. 
Respondent, and their two children always lived in Mexico City. They lived there until the time _ 
Ms. Libbey-Aguilera'removed the children from Mexico to Utah in December 2010. 
19 The parties had reached this agreement while the court was still conducting its in 
camera interviews ofthe children. After the interviews, the comt praised this agreement by the 
parries and confirmed to counsel diat the children were scal"ed to see their father. See Transcript, 
Docket No. 25 pp. ~-46. 
20 See Sealed Docket No. 35, Letter from Paul W. Dawson, MSW, LCSW. 
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There appears to have been ·significant discord in the ml'llTiage for many years. When 
Petitioner expressed his desire for a divorce in September 2007. Respondent took a trip to . 
Texas, talcing the two children with her without seeking permission from their fatber. The 
circumstances of her rerum several days later are disputed but immaterial to the resolution of this 
matter. In any event, aftel' her renun to Mexico, Petitioner filed for divorce in early October 
2007 in Mexico City. 
On October 16, 2007, the Mexican coW1 issued an Order baning the removal of the 
children from Mexico. Petitioner had sought such an Order because of the previo\15 incident 
when Respondent bad taken the children to Texas witbout his pem1ission. Ou December 14; 
2007, after a mediation on December 11, 2007, the court ordered that Ms, Libbey-Aguilera 
would be granted the provisional physical custody of the children at their marital domicile. 
. ' 
Petitioner would have visits on Sanu-days and Sundays every other week from l 0:00 a.m. • l :00 
p.m. at the Supervised Visitation and Socialization Center. It was also ordered that Mr. Matas• 
Vidal may socialize with his children on holidays. the children's birthdays, and fifty percent of 
school vacations, with prior notice and mutual agreement of both parties.21 The December 14~ 
2007 Order again proiuoited Respondent from taking the children out of Mexico. :n 
On June 30, 2010, the Mexican court issued an order granting "custodia definitiva,, to 
21 These visits would not have been at the Socialization Center, and it does not appear 
that Respondent ever penuitfed these visits. · 
::2 See Docket No. 22· l, Respoudeut's Affidavit in Support to Objections to Petition for 
hnmediate Return, p. 4; see also Docket No. 28-,3, Ex. S(b) Temporary Custody & Support 
Order, English Translation. 
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Respondent (the "Jw1e 30, 20 l 0 Order").23 Respondent argues U1at tbe Order granted her "sole 
custody" and dissolved ~y restrictions on her travel outside of Mexico. Petitioner, however, has 
provided evidence that the English translation of "cnstodia definitiva" is not "sole custody," as 
. . 
that tenn is understood in the United States, and he lias also pro'vided evidence that, because he 
still had custody rights, Respondent was still prohibited from leaving Mexico.:~ The June 30, . 
20 l 0 Order provided that Mr. Matas-Vidal "bas the obligation and essential human right to visit 
and go out with bis children ... on Saturdays and Sundays ... every other weekend. Visitations 
shall begin on Saturdays at 10 AM and end on Sundays at 6 PM." 2) These visits were not 
ordered to take place at the Supervised Visitation and Socialization Center. Mr. Matas-Vidal was 
to «pick the children ~p at they place where they live with their mother and return them to the 
same place."26 
In August 2010, each pai·ent appealed the JW1e 30, 20 IO Order. Mr. Matas-Vidal 
appealed the Order because, among other things, he believed that Ms. Libbey-Aguilera was 
obstructing his ability to visit with the children and he thought further psychological testing 
' 1 : 
. : 
would assist the cowt in its determination.27 Owing 2010, new psychological examinations were 
23 Docket No. 28, Ex. 14(b). The Otde1·was published ou July 12, 2010. Respondent 
initially claimed that the Order was entered on July 12, 2005>, but there is no dispute now that the 
Order was published on July l 2, 2010, following proceedings on June 30,201 0. 
?.f Docket No: 31, Ex. 2. 
:?> Docket No: 28, Ex. 14(b) atp. 14 (English Translation). 
26 Id. 
21 It is unclear why Ms. Libbey-Aguilera appealed, but she bas not disputed that she 
appealed the June 30,' 2010 Order. 
10 
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in progress but were uot filed with U1e cowt ur1til February 2011-after Respondent bad fled 
Mexico. 
On November 25, 2010, a bifurcated decree of divorce was entered. Thus, the divorce 
had become fmal. but the issue of child custody and support were still being litigated. During 
the custody litigatio~ Petitione1· exercised all visitation awarded to hin1 by U1e Mexican court. 
He regtdarly exercised his right of access until the children were removed from Mexico. On 
January s. 2011 and January 9, 2011, he went to the Supervised Family Interaction Center but 
Ms. Libbey-Aguilera and the boys did not show up. He then confinned that they no longer lived · 
at their marital home and was informed by the boys' school that. as of December 16, 20 i 0, the 
boys had stopped attending school. 
In December 20 l 0, Respondent surreptitiously removed the children from Mexico to the. 
United States.28 She came directly to Orem, Utah and enrolled the children .in school on 
December 21~ 2010. They have been contitmously enrolled in the same scbool since January 
2011. Teachers and administrators have repeatedly noted their good behavior and academic 
excellence. 29 The children are both on a competitive swim team. SM-L was a cub scout and 
now participates regularly as a boy scout. . He also is on a soccer team. RM-L is a cub scout 
They were both baptized as members of the Church of Jesus Christ o~Latter-day Saints and 
attend meetings regularly. SM-L received the Aaronic Priesthood when he turned twelve. They 
both spend substantial time with their maternal grandmother. Respondent began working for the 
28 Respondent claims that she acted on the belief that the final custody order no longer 
i-estrlcted her from lawfully talcing the children across the border to the United States. Docket 
No. 2.2-1, Respondent's Aff. at p.6. 
29 See Docket No. 22-1. Respondent's Aff. at pp.7-8 and attached exhibits. 
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Provo School District. on March 7, 2011 and bas 1-emained gainfully employed with tl1e district· 
since that tinte. 
On January 7, 2011, after Respondent had removed the children from Mexico, the 
Mexican appeals court revoked tlle June 30, 2010 01"der. 011 February 4, 2011, die second set 
of psycl1ological repo/:fs were issued. JO While the English translations of these reports are 
somewhat difficult to analyze, it is clear that the psychological report on the children found that 
they did not have em~tional indications that were consistent with a profile of a child that had 
suffel'ed violence.l1 In addition, while the boys both had a negative view of their father, the 
psychologist noted lheir pel'ception was "witllout sustaining real or v,alid experiences" and that 
their attitudes "are determined by induction and manipulation whfob their mother has exercised 
upon them. nll 
The psychological report on Ms. Libbey-Aguilera found, mnong other things, that she had 
a "tendency to lie," dysf11nctional behavior patterns which may affect in a negative manner the 
interaction within her family and social envirownent," that she ''tends to carry out manipulation 
attitudes in particular:with her children,,. and tliat she had "aggressive ot violent teudencies, 
' 
especially of a verbal:nature.11 The report also noted that Ms. Libbey-Aguilera now reported 
30 The findings in tbese second psychological reports do not vary significantly from Ille 
initial reports, prepared in 2008. See Docket No. 28, Ex. 1 l(b). . 
11 See Docket No. 4-1, Ex·. 21-b, p. 7. 
32 Docket No. ·4-1, Ex. 21-b, pp.4-5. The psychologist noted that the dread the boys feel 
about their fatber is "more consistent with induction• and manipulation attitudes to them than as a 
result of their own experiences," id. p. 7, and that it "is inferred that they have been mostly 
induced or manipulated by their mother." Id. 
33 Docket No. 4, Ex. 20-ll, pp. 210-212. 
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laking the children to a private psychological evalualiou to confinn the use of violence and 
sexual abuse, which was infonnation Ms. Libbey-Aguilera"did uot express in her first 
evaluation."H The psychological report on Mr. Matas-Vidal stated tliat there were no indications 
of aggressive or violent tendencjes.35 The psychologist found no reason wliy he should not live 
together with his children. 36 Petitioner suggests tllat Respondent fled before the reports were 
issued because she suspected that they would not be favorable to her. 
On February 9, 2011, in the District Court for the Seventk Judicial District in the State of 
Idaho, Respondent had her name legally changed to Brooke Robinson, claiming that she needed 
to change her name because she was "divorcing her husband and am seeking to avoid being 
located by my husband for the reason he bas threatened to kill me and my family."37 Respondent 
and her two children had been living in Orem, Utah from December 2010 through the present. 
time. 
Petitioner had been looking for his children since he realized tl1ey were gone in January 
2011. He had started to try to find Respondent iu Texas, believing she was there be<:ause she had 
previously purchased a condominium there. Because she had changed her name to Brooke 
Robinson in early 2011, and because she had changed the boys• names in lheir school records i11. 
34 Id. p. 207, 
35 Docket No. 4, p. 183, 191. 
36 Id. at p. 183. 
37 Docket No. 30-7, Exhibit 7. As required by Idaho law, respondent represented iu Iler 
name-change petition that she was a resident ofldaho, but Respondent admits now that she was 
never a resident ofidaho. 
13 
000030 
m2u12221~ ~m61 Ril~~ Asalie1™54i4 
Appellate Case: 13-4117 Document: 01019113857 Date Filed: 08/~272013 Page: 21 
: j 
October 2011,38 it took Petitioner Wltil earlier this year to discover where his children were 
located. Law enforcerttent located Respondent in Utah in May 2013. The instant Petition was 
filed on June 7, 2013;39 
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. APPLICABILITY OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
The court finds that the Convention applies to this dispute. SM-L and RM-L are both 
under 16 years old; they were habitual residents of Mexico; and both Mexico and the United 
States are contracting states. -to See 42 U.S.C. § l 1603(e)(l)(A); Hague Conv., art. 3. 
B. WHETHER THE REMOVAL WAS WRONGFUL 
Jbe fust qutlstion the court must address is whether the children were "wrongfully 
removed" from Mexi;co, or, in other words. whether tl1ey were removed in violation of a right of 
custody. Once a petitioner esCablishes that removal was wrongful, the child must be returned 
unless an exception is applicable. Abbott v. Abbott 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990 (2010) (citing 42 
U.S.C. § § 11603(a)); Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240,245 (211,s Cir. 1999); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
I l 60 l(a)( 4) ("Children who are wrongfully removed or retained witbin the meaning of the 
Conveution are to be. promptly retumed unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the 
Conver:Jtion applies.'1- Moreover, "[e]ven where the gro1u1ds for one of these ''narrow" 
exceptions have bee~ established, the district court is not necessarily bound to allow the child to 
38 See Docket No. 28, Ex. 23. 
351 Docket N~. 1. 
~
0 The court finds wuneritorious Respondent's argu01ent that the children's habitual 
residence had shifted to the United States at the time of removal. 
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remain witb the abducting parent." Blondin, 189 F.3d at 246 n.4 (quoting Friedrich v. Friedrich, 
78 F.Jd 1060. 1067) (Sh Cir. 1996) ("[A] federal distiict court retains. and should use when 
appropriate, the discretion to return a child, despite the existence of a defense, if return would 
further the aims of the Convention.")). 
Petitioner bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
removal or retention was wrongful Accordingly, Petitioner must demonstrate that: 
(A) the child was habit1.1ally resident in a given state at the.time of the removal 
or retention; 
(B) the removal or retention was in breach of petitioner's custody rights under 
the Jaws of that state; and 
©) petitioner was exercising those rights at the time of removal or retention. 
Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct 1017, 1021 (2013) (quoting Hague Conv .• art. 3). 
Here. the court finds that Petitioner has met his burden of showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that SM-L and RM-L \'vere habinially resident in Mexico 
City at the time of the removal. The children were born in Mexico City and never lived 
anywhere other tban Mexico until Respondent removed ~1em to the United States in 
December 2010. 
The court also concludes that the removal was in breach of Petitioner's custody 
rights wide1· Mexican law and that Petitioner was exercising those rights at the time of 
removal. Although Respondent claims that she was awarded "sole custody" and that any 
restraints on her ability to take the childl"en across the bordei· were dissolved, the court 
does not agree. The July 9, 2010 Order states that Respondent was given "custodia 
IS 
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deiinitiva," but that is not the same thing as "sole custody," as discussed below.41 It is unclear 
why Respondent beli~ved that the Order gave hel' the right to leave Mexico with the children 
when the June 30, 2010 Order provided that Mr. Matas-Vidal could visit and socialize with his 
children on Saturdays end Sundays every two weeks from Saturday at 10:00 a.m. until Sunday at 
6.00p.m.~? 
Moreover, both parties appealed that order in August 20 I 0. Under Mexican law, the 
challenged order had no effect, so the ne exeat order from October 16, 2007 remained in effect.43 
In addition, even the bifurcated divorce decree, issued on November 25, 2010, provides 
' that: "both parties stated that no settlement may be reached, since the legal status of their 
minor children whose names are [SM-L.and RM-L] are subject to litigation with the 
36th Mexico City Family Court. 1144 Because the June 30. 2010 order was being appealed, 
and because custody was still subject to litigation, the interim ne exeat order from 
October 16, 2007co11tinued to apply.45 
41 The July 9, 2010 Order was ultimately revoked on January 10, 2011. See Docket No. 
30, Ex. 5 (the Order is mistakenly identified as being published on Janmuy 10, 2010, but there is 
no dispute that it was published 011 Janumy l 0, 2011). Because Respondent had akeady left the 
country, the court canuot rely on the revocation of that Oi:der in considedng the status of custody 
rights as of the date ~f the wrongful removal. 
~
2 Docket No. 28, Ex. 14(b). 
43 See Petitioner's Reply Memorandwn, Docket No. 31, Ex. 2, which is a Declaration by 
Petitioner's Mexican attorney clarifying these points of Mexican law. 
~
4 Respond~t•s Opp'n, Exhibit 17(b) to DocwnentNo. 22, near end of first 
paragraph (emphasis added). 
~s The Mexican cow1 reiterated in September 2011 that the ne exeat Order still applied. 
See Docket No. 4-1, Ex. 23(b). The court has oot considered this fact in determining whether the 
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Regardless of which Order applied, however, Petitioner had intrinsic ne exeat 
rights baning the child1·e11' s removal. If a petitioner only has .. rights of access" mther 
than "rights of custody," then the petitioner cannot seek retl.1111 of the child m1der the 
Convention. See, e.g., Abbott. 130 S. Ct. at 1989. The issue of"custody" must be 
addressed 1mde1· the law ofMexico. -See Pesin v. Osorio Rodriguez, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 
1284 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Oblander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1541 (101h Cir. 1997). 
Pursuant to Mexico's Civil Code, both parents generally have "rights of custody" to their 
children at all times. See, e.g .• Asuncion Mota v. Rivera Castillo, 692 F.3d 108 (2nd Cir. 
2012); Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2000); Saldivar v. Rodela, 879 F~ Supp. 
2d 610 (W.D. Tex. 2012). In these cases, the U.S. court accepted affidavits from 
Mexican lawyers desc1ibing rights of custody in Mexico. 
In this case, Petitioner has pl'ovided a declaration by Petitioner's Mexican cowisel, 
in which he provides an explanation of patria potestas, which means "parental anthority" 
in Spanish, and is somewhat akin to the Ame1ican notion of"legal custody,11 Ol" 
decision-making authority for a minor child. In Spanish, "custodia" refers to what we in 
the United States would call "physical cnstody,11 which addresses which parent a child· 
( I • ~1 1, 
lives with. While a Mexican co\u1 may grant custody to one parent, that does not negate 
removal was wrongful because Respondent bad already fled Mexico by that time. The Order, 
however, lends credence to the legal explanations of Petitioner's attorney in Mexico, as noted 
below. 
17 
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the other parent's rights of parental authority.46 
In Abbotv. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010), the United States Supreme Court concluded 
that a ne exeat right is a right of custody under the Convention. See id. at 1990-91. A ne e,reat 
right consists of the authority to consent before the other parent may talce the child to another 
country. See id. at 1987. 
Having considered the various cases cited by the parties, the court concludes that 
Petitioner's patria potestas rights are rights of custody 1mder the Hague Convention. 
Accordingly, Respondent's removal of the children from Mexico violated Petitioner's 
rights of custody that arose under the laws of Mexico and therefore. the removal was 
wrongful. 
As noted previously, once a petitioner establishes that removal was wrongful, the child 
must bereh1med unless an exception is applicable. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1990 (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ § 11603(a)). Respondent, has asserted several defenses available under the Hague 
Convention, which will be addressed in tum below 
C. RESPONDENT'S DEFENSES 
I. Article 13 "Grave Harm" Defense 
Respondent contends that there is a grave risk that return of the children would 
expose them to physical and/or psychological ha11n. Pul'suant to Alticle 13 of the 
Convention. a court is not bound to order the relUm of the child if the person who . 
415 See Docket No. 31, Ex. 2. 
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opposed the return establishes that .. there is a grave risk that his return would expose the 
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an iutolerable 
situation." Art. 13(b); Respondent must establish the grave 1isk by "clear and 
convincing" evidence. 42. U.S.C. § l 1603(e)(2). 
A "grave lisk" ofhann from repatriation mises in two siruatious: (1) where 
returning the child means sending him to a zone of war, famine, or disease; or (2) in cases 
of serious abuse or neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the 
country of habitual residence, for whatever reason. may be incapable or unwilling to give 
the child adequate protection. 
In addition. the potential hann to the child must be severe, and "[t]he level of risk 
and dange1· required to trigger this exception has co11sistently been held to be very high." 
Norden-Powers v. Beveridge, 125 F. Supp. 2d 634,640 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing cases). 
The grave tisk involves not only the magnitude of the potential hmm but also the 
probability that the h311B will materialize. Van de Sande v. Va11 de Sa11de, 431 F.3d 567, 
570 (7th Cir. 2005). 
In this case, Respondent has not established by clear and convincing evidence that 
there is a grave risk that the return of the children would expose them to physical or 
psychological ham1 or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation; The children 
would not be 1;etumed to a zone of war, famine, or disease. 
In addition, while Respondent has alleged that she and the children were victims of 
19 
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domestic violence, the court is-not persuaded that these allegations are entirely true.47 For 
example, Respondent did not raise any such concerns dwing her divorce proceedings. In 
fact, in her Answer to the Complaint for Divorce. she states .. there was an exchange of 
insults. where today the plaintiff [Mr. Matas-Vidal] always acted in a mocking way and 
although he bad never physically assaulted me, he did it with his attitudes." 48 This 
Answer is dated November 22, 2007, well after the parties separated on August 5, 2007. 
In addition, the psychological repo1ts submitted in this case do not suggest that Petitioner 
was abusive toward;his wife or children or that Respondent reported any abuse at that 
time. Indeed, the initial psychological report states that "with regard to the children. -
[Petitioner] was identified with an affective bond toward them, showing interest and concern for 
them, affective and normative toward them, so there are 110 proble,ns for coexistence." "9 Tile 
final report reached t4e same conclusion. so 
Indeed, the supplementaJ repo1ts suggest that Respondent bad manipulated her 
children to dislike their father. Among other things, the psychologist stated: 
From analysis of obtained infonnation at applied instruments, there were 
not found significant data to establish that minor children show fear 
attitudes to any of their parents, becoming impo11ant the fact that even 
~, Even if some of the allegations are true, they have not been proven by clear and 
convincing evidence, and, in any event, the court does not find that they rise to a level of 1isk and 
danger that would justify applying this exception. 
~
8 Docket No.: 28-2, Ex. 4 ,r 9 {emphasis added). 
~
11 Docket No. 28-9, Ex. 11. 
~ DocketNo.4,pp.183, 191. 
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though they openly express feeling certain dread to their fatber, this results 
more consistent with induction and manipulation attitudes to them than as a 
result of their own experiences.s1 
Also, while Respondent initially submitted a translation of very negative 
comments the children allegedly made during a mediation, Petitioner pointed out that tbe 
translation was completely inaccurate (and that it was a fraud upon the court). 52 
Respondent later ftled Corrections, conceding that the translation submitted was not 
actually a translation of the mediation, but of other reports and hearings and that the 
inadvertent mistake had been made due to language ba1riers and time constraints. 53 
..... 
During the mediation, no allegations of abuse were raised, and wlien SM-L was questioned, be 
declared he loved and wanted to visit with his father. His negative comment to the court was thai 
his father lied to the boys by saying he would play with them, then did not~~ The family 
pediatrician never noticed any type of evidence that would suggest any type of physical 
abuse.5' The parties' marriage counselor has also pl'ovided an affidavit stating that she 
saw no issues of violence between them, and neither party mentioned any violence in the 
51 DoeketNo. 4-1, Ex. 21(b) at p. 7. 
52 Docket Nos. 30, 3 l. 
>3 Docket 33. Co(l'ections to Respondent's Exhibits. The coiirt bas no doubt that the 
incorrect translation was inadvertently submitted. · · 
54 Docket No. 30, Ex. 1, 2._ 
>> Docket No. 30, Ex. 9. 
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home. 56 
The cJrildren;s current fear of their father.appears to be tiased primarily (but not 
exclusively) on one:alleged "incident" involving each child. When SM-L was sixteen-
months old: Respondent claims that Petitioner pushed b.im against a step in the bathroom, from 
which he sustained a ~ut above )1is right eye and was seen by a plastic surgeon. Petitioner claims 
that a shaky changing table gave way and SM-L fell to the floor. 
When RM-L was 15 months old, Respondent claims that Petitioner pushed him into 
a chair resulting in eye injuries. Petitioner denies that this happened. 57 While the court 
cannot divine what actually happened in these various alleged incidents, what is clear is 
that both children d~scussed these events with the cow1 as though they had clear 
memories of the occurrences, which the court does not find to be plausible, given their 
ages at the time;58 They also appear to have general recollections of their father choking. 
sc1 Id. 
57 He also denies another incident alleged by Respondent-that he slammed a piano 
cover shut, thereby injming RM-L's face. In fact, Petitioner claims that they never even 
had a piano. 
)s Responden~ also claims that Petitioner pushedRM-L into a pipe in the yard at the 
Supervision Center, splitting his lip. Petitioner denies that this happened, and the Center Report 
from June 14, 2008 reported that Petitioner was playing with the children in the garden, where 
they were playing ball and that RM-L accidentally struck bis elbow on a tube serving as a garden 
fence. There is also a note stating that when Petitioner noticed it. he washed it with soap and 
water. See Docket No. 30, Ex. 10. Givea that the visits were supervi~ed and that there·is·a · 
contemporaneous note stating what. happened. the court does not ipve any credence to · 
Respondent's version of this incident. The court also does uot give c1-ede11ce to Respondent's 
claim that Petitioner's brother arrived at the Visitation Ce.oter ~ Octpber 2009 to attempt to 
kidnap the children. 
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or spanking them, along with other instances of violence, but these allegations have not 
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
Moreover, the records submitted from the Supe1vised Visitation Center suggest 
that, at first, tl1e children did not exhibit any fear or reluctance to see their father. Indeed, 
they appeared to demonstrate a w~ loving, and playful interaction. 59 Over time, 
however, they seemed to develop more hesitation about seeing him, which he blames on 
Ms. Libbey-Aguilera's effods to alienate the children from him. The reason the children 
most often gave to the supervisors about their reluctance to visit with their father was that 
his breath was bad. It seems unlikely that the children would provide such an answer if 
they were actually subjected to physical or psychological abuse, and it is puzzling that the 
children did not appear to have any reluctance to see their father dtu·ing the beginning 
weeks or months of their supervised visits. Indeed, even the Mexican Court Order from 
Jooe 30, 20 I 0, upon which Respondent reties to argue that she was awarded sole custody, states 
that "tbere is no danger" in "any of tl1e parents exercising custoay" arul stated that Mr. Matas-
Vidal bad ''the obligation and essential human right to visit and out with his n1inol' children" 
· fSVecy other weekend. 00 
It is not the function of this court, however. to detennine whether any domestic 
violence actually occurred. This cow1 must detennine, in cases where "serious abuse or 
S9 See Docket 30, Ex. 10. 
~ Docket No. 28-13, Ex. 14(b) at page 38 of 40. 
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neglect" has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, whether Mexico would be 
incapable or unwilling to provide protection to the children. The court finds that 
Respondent has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that ther~ is evidence . 
of "serious abuse or neglect." and that even if there were, she has not demonstrated that 
Mexican courts would be incapable of providi11g adequate protection. Thus, the court 
concludes that Article 13 "grave risk" defense does not apply in this case. 
ii. Article 20:"Public Policy" Defense 
. Article 20 of the Convention states, "The return of the child under the provisions 
of Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles 
of the requested-Stat_e relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms." This is a_n affumative defense that Respondent must prove by cl.ear and 
convincing evidence. 42 U.S.C. § l 1603(e)(2)(A). This is often referred to as the "public 
I 
policy" defense. The defense is to be invoked only on "the rare occasion that rentrn of a 
child would utterly shock the conscience of the· court or offend all notions of due 
process." Souratgar ":'· Fair, 2013 WL 2631375 at •s (2°d Cir. Jtme 13, 2013) (quoting 
U.S. State Dep't, Hague International Child Abduction Coi1vention: Text and Legal 
Analysis, Pub. Notice 957, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986)). "We note that 
this defense has yet to be used by a federal court to deny a petition for repatriation." Id. 
(citing Fed. Jud. Ctr;, The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction: A ~uide for Judges 85 (2012)). The cowt finds no merit to this 
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defense and summarily denies it. 
iii. Article 12 "Well-Settled,. Defense 
Article 12 provides, in relevant part: 
Where a child has been wrongfully removed ... and, at the date of the 
commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority 
of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has 
elapsed from the date of the wrongfi.d removal or retention, the authority 
concerned shall order the return of the child fortbwith. The judicial or 
administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after 
the expiration oflhe period of one year refe1Ted to in the proceeding paragraph, 
shall also order the return of the child, w1less it is demonstrated that the child is 
now settled in its new environment. 
Art. 12 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the default preswnption under the Convention is that a 
: 1 
child shall be returned to.the stat~ from which he originally was wrongfully removed unless both 
' ' ' 
of two conditions are met: (1) one year has elapsed between the date of wrongful removal and the 
date proceedings commence; and (2) the child is found to be "now settled in its new 
environment." Loranzo v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 51 (2ud Cir. 2012). In other words. if more 
than one year has elapsed since the date of wrongful removal and the child is now settled 
in his new environment, the court may- but need not- refuse to order repatriation. See 
Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 164 (2d Cir. 2001). Put differently, "if more than one 
year has passed. a 'demonstra[tion] that the child is now settled in its new environment' 
may be a sufficient gl'ound for reft1sing to order repatriation... Id. The standard under 
Article 12 does not call for detenuining in whic~ location the child is relatively better 
· settled, but rather for detennining whether the child has become so settled in a new 
environment that repatriation would be against the child's best interest. Id. 
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In detemuning whether a child is settled within the meaning of Alticle 12, a court 
considers a number of factors that bear on whether the child has "significant connections to the 
new co\Ultry." 51 Fed. Reg. at 10509. These factors include: (1) 1he child's age; (2) the stability 
and duration oftl1e child's iesidence in the new envirODment; (3) whether the child attends school 
or day care consistently; ( 4) whether the child has friends and relatives in the new area; (5) the 
child's participation in comm1.urlty or extracurricular school activities, such as team sports, youth· 
groups, or school clubs; and (6) the respondent's employment and fmancial stability. In some 
circumstances, we will also consider the immigration status of the child and the respondent. In 
general, this consideration will be relevant only if there is an immediate, concrete threat of 
deportation. Although all of these factors, when applicable, may be considered in the "settled" 
analysis, ordinarily the most important is the length and stability of the child's residence in the 
new environment. In Re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F .3d 999, l 009 (9111 Cu- 2009) 
In the instant case, SM-L and RM-L have been in Utah since late December. 
2010-for over two and one-half years. The court finds that they are both very well 
settled. And given the boys• ages, 12 and 9 ½, respectively, these thirty-plus months have 
been meaningful to .the boys. They have been consistently enrolled in school since 
· January 2011. They have missed very few days duri11g those two school years, and their 
academic success has been remarkable. 61 Botl1 boys have many friends., caring neighbors, 
61 For example, their school principal bas written a glowing review of both boys, slating. 
among other things, that "they both are among the very best behaved and well-mannered students 
I have known in school during my 13 years as a teacher and 15 years as a public school 
administrator. They have exce1Jent attendance, including never being tardy to school the entire 
past year, and they liave never required any attendant or behavior interventions from the school 
or their teachers.,. In addition, he stated that both "regldarly m·e recognized and receive awards 
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and fellow LOS church members with whom they have formed close bonds. Their 
maternal grandmother also frequently cares for them. The children are active u1 their 
church. in_boy scouts (or cub scouts for RM-L), and they are on a competitive swim team. 
SM-L is also on a soccer team. Many friends and neighbors have provided glowing 
letters about Respondent and the boys, aud attesting to the boys' happiness and stable 
environment.152 Their mother bas also been consistently employed since March 2011 and 
appears to be financially stable.63 They boys botll speak fluent English and appear to have 
adjusted well to their living situation. Given the outpouring of support for the boys and 
Respondent, both in terms of having friends and neighbors attend the two court hearings 
and in submitting letters to the court, the court has no question that these two boys ai·e 
s\urounded by a loving a_nd supportive communi1y and that the boys are thriving in their . 
currei1t environment. They are indeed settled in their new environment · 
a. Equitable Tolling 
Petitioner argues that be is entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year period for the filing 
of his Hague petition and that the Article 12 defense is therefore inapplicable. Article 12 of the 
Convention requires the retwn of a child. whether or not he is "settled," if the n~n-abductiug 
in our quarterly recognition celebrations for going "above and beyond" in numerous ways, and in 
every way they are exemplary students and citizens." He also notes that "they are thriving and 
happy in school, and they are well on their way to being happy, productive, and successful 
citizeus. I have absolutely no concerns about them or their well-being." See Docket No. 28, Ex. 
21J, Letter from School Principal, dated Jwie 26, 2013, 
02 See Docket No. 28, Ex. 26. 
oi Id. 
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parent files his Hague petition within one year oftbe child's wrongful removal or retention. See 
Hague Convention, art. 12. 
Some courts have held that equitable principles may be applied to toll the one-year period 
when circumstances suggest that the abducting parent took steps to conceal the whereabouts of 
the child from the parent seeking return and such concealment delayed the filing of the petition 
for return." See, e.g .• Duarte v. Bardales, 526 F.3d 563,570 (9111 Cir. 2008). Relying on this 
holding, Petitioner contends that, even if the court finds the boys to be "now settled," the court 
should nevertheless 01·der their rehun because Respondent concealed the boys and because 
Petitioner filed his petition within one year of learning of their location. While the court agrees 
that Respondent concealed the boys, that such concealment delayed Petitioner's ability to file a 
petition, and that he filed his petition within one year after he fmally learned of their location, the 
court declines to apply equitable tolling to the one-year mandatory return period. 
The United States Circuit Cowis of Appeals are divided on the issue of equitable tolling 
in this sin1ation. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have found that 
equitable tolling may apply in certain circumstances, such as when circwnstances suggest that the 
abducting parent took steps to conceal the whereabouts of the children and the conceabnent 
caused tbe petitioning parent's filing delay. See Dietzv. Dietz, 2009 WL 3378590 (5th Cir. Oct. 
20, 2009); In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1014; Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 723-24 (l ltb Cir. 2004). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
however, has concluded that equitable tolling found that it does not apply. See Loranzo v. 
Alvarez, 697F.3d41, 51 (2nd Cir. 2012),cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (June 24, 2013). 
The Tenth Circuit has not addressed the issue. Because of the split among the Circuits, the 
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United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on the issue, and thus lhe issue will be 
decided within the next tenn. &-1 
In the meantime, however, this court agrees with the Second Circuit and other district 
courts that have found that the purpose of the one-year lllandatory retum period is not to provide 
a deadline for a petitioner to assert a claim but rather is to put e limit on the \lprooting of a settled 
child. As one district court explained, "the evident import of [Article 12's one-year period] is 
not so much to provide a potential plaintiff with a reasonable time to assert any claims, as a 
statute of limitations does, but rather to put some limit on the uprooting of a settled child." 
Toren v. Toren. 26 F. Supp. 2d 240,244 (D. Mass.1998), opinion vacated on other grounds by 
Toren v. Toren, 191 F.3d 23 (1st CirJ999); see also Perez-Vera Report1107. 
The district court in Lozano fo1md that, unlike a statute of limitations prohibiting a parent 
from filing a return petition after a year bas expired, the "settled" defense merely permits courts 
to consider the interests of a child who has been in a new envirooment for more than a year 
before ordering that child to be returned to her country of habitual residency. See Lozano, 809 F. 
Supp. 2d at 227-28 (reasoning that the one-year period in Article 12 is not analogous to a statute 
of limitations); see also Aranda v. Serna, 911 F. Supp. 2d 601,613 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (finding 
the reasoning of the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits unpersuasive end agreeing with Second 
Circuit that equitable tolling does not apply to equitably toll the one-year period based on 
concealment); Yaman v. Yaman. 2013 WL 322204 (D. N.H. Jan. 28, 2013) (same); Matovski v. 
Matovski, 2007 WL 2600862, at"' 12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007) (concluding that one-year period 
is not analogous to a statute of limitations); Anders~n v. Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 872,875 (S.0. 
~ Lozano v. Alvarez, 133 S. Ct. 2851 (June 24, 2013). 
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Ohio 2002) (same); Toren v. Toren, 26 F. Supp. 2d 240,244 (D. Mass.1998) (same), vacated on 
other gro1mds, 191 F.pd 23 (1st Cir.1999). 
Even the Ninth Circuit, while still applyin~ equitable tolling. recognized that "[t]he 
rationale behind Article 12's ''now settled" defense is that when. a child bas become settled and 
adjusted in his new envir01unent, a forced return might only serve to cause him fiarther distress 
and accentuate the hann caused by the wrongful relocation." In re B. De. C.S.B., 559 F.3d 999, 
l 00 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Beaumont & McEleavy, The Hague Couveution 011 International 
Child Abduction 203 (1999)). 
The Second Circuit, in a well-researched and well-reasoned opinion, rejected the 
petitioner's argument on appeal that the district court should have equitably tolled the one-year 
filing period until the '.date he reasonably could detennine that his daughter had been removed 
from the United K.mgdom and taken to the United States. Loiano, 697 F.3d at S0-51. The 
Second Circuit reco~ed that: 
While the text: of the Convention does not explicitly address the issue, we ]!ote 
that the text does provide one clue that tolling was not anticipated. The language 
of Article 12 expressly starts the running of the one-year pedod "from the date of 
the wrongful removal or retention." . It would have been a simple matter, if the 
state parties to the Convention wished to take account of the possibility that an 
abducting parent might make it difficult for lhe petitioning parent to discover the 
child's whereabouts, to run the period "from the date that the petitioning parent 
teamed [ or, could reasonably have learned] of the child's whereabouts." But the 
drafters did not adopt such language . ... [Tjhe drafting history demonstrates that 
Ibis was a conscious choice, and that the drafters specifically rejected a proposal 
to have a different date trigger the start of the one-year period wbeu the chlld's 
whereabouts had been concealed. 
Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 51 n. 8 (211d Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). TI1e Lozano 
court also found that th.is interpretation of Article 12 "is further bolstered by Article 18, which 
provides that none olthe provisious in the Convention "limit the power of a judicial or 
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administrative autJ1ority to order the return of the child at any time." 101.ano. 697 F.3d at 52 n.10 
(citing Convention, art. 18). Moreover, the Lozano court also relied on the Perez-Vera Repotfl 
and concluded that: 
Simply put, the Convention is not intended to promote the return of a cluld lo his 
or her count[}' of habitual residency irrespective of that child's best interests; 
rather, the Convention embodies the judgment that in most instances, a child's 
welfare is best served by a prompt return to that country. The signatory states, 
however, were aware tbat there are situations where "the removal of the child can 
... be justified by objective reasons which have to do either with [the child's] 
person, or with the environment with which tthe childJ is most closely 
cowiected." Perez-Vera Report at 432 ,i 25. Accordingly, the Convention 
"rec08Jlizes the need for certain exceptions" to the signatory states' .. general 
obligation[ ] ... to secure the prompt 1·etum of children who have been unlawfully 
removed or retained." Id. Perez-Vera descnoes these .. exceptions" as "concrete 
illustrations of the overly vague p1inciple whereby the interests of the child are 
stated to be the guiding criterion in tllis area." 
Id. at 53-54; see also Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153, 164 (2nc1 Cir. 2001) ("Blondin II") 
(noting that the Convention's drafters recognized tliat, despite the general aim of"ensurLingj the 
retum of abducted children," there .. could come a point at which a child would become so settled 
in a new environment mat repatriation might not be in its best interest."). 
In sum. the Second Circuit dete1mined dint die Convention's drafting history "strongly 
supports the position that the one-year period in Article 12 was designed to allow courts to talce 
into account a cbiid's interest in remaining in the countcy to which he bas been abducted after a 
os As noted by the Second Circuit, Elisa Perez-Vera was "the official Hague Conference 
reporter for the Convention." Lozano, 697 F.3d at 52 n.11 (quoting Hague International Child 
Abduction Convention; Text and Lega] Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10,S03). "Her explaoatory 
report [wasj recognized by the Conference as the official history and commentary on the 
Convention," id., and-we have previously held that "it is an authoritative source for interpreting 
the Convention's provisions,'' id. (citing Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 137 n. 3 (2d Cir.2000)) 
(citation omitted), abrogated on other grow1ds by Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983; see also Gitter, 396 
F.3dat 129&n. 4. 
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ce11ain amount of time has passed." 697 F.3d ar 54. The court concluded that, [i]fthis 
understanding of the second paragraph of Article 12 is correct, allowing equitable tolling of the 
one-year period would unden:nine its purpose. A child may develop au interest in remaining in a 
country in which she has lived for a substantial amount of time regardless of her parents' efforts 
to couceal or locate her." See Lozano. 697 F.3d at 54. This COllrt agrees. 
While the court acknowledges that it may seem unfair and inequitable to Petitioner 
that the Respondent has essentially been "rewarded" for successfully Wcling her children. 
the alternative detennination-to uproot these two boys after they have become so well 
settled in their new envil'omnent in which they liave spentlthe past two and one-half 
' i 
years-seems even more reprehensible and contraiy to the ultimate purpose of the Hague 
Convention. Thus, the cowt declines to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to the 
Alticle 12 "well-settled" defense. 
iv. The Article 13 .. Age and Maturity" Exception 
The Hague C~nvention provides that "(t]be judicial or administrative authority 
[ considering a petition] may also l'.~fnse to order tlle retum of the child if it finds that the 
child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it 
is appropriate to take account of its views ... Hague Convention. rut 13. The age and 
manuity exception is to be narrowly consti11ed and must be shown by a preponderance of 
: ~ . 
the evidence. England v. England, 234 F.3d 268,272 (5th Cir.2000) (citing§§ 
11601(a)(4), l 1603(e)(2)(A)). 
In applying the "ase and maturity" exception, a coll11 must not focus solely on the general 
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goal of the Convention-to protect children from the hannful effects.of wrongful removal-but 
must also carefully determine that the particular child "'bas obtained an age and degree of 
maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.'" Blo11din v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 
240,247 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Convention, art. 13). The Convention contains no age limit for 
applying the exception. Blondin II, 238 F.3d at 167; Raijmakers-Eghaghe v. Haro, 131 F. Supp. 
2d 953,957 (E. D. Mich.2001). 
In this ease, SM-L is twelve-years old and will start seventh grade next month. Riv!-L 
will be ten-years old in three months and will soon start fowtl1 grade. The court had the 
opportunity to observe the demeanor and maturity of both children during the court's in camera 
inteiview of each of them. Undoubtedly the task of meeting alone with a federal judge and bis 
staff, with no parents or attorneys present, was a daunting one, but both boys faced the_ situation 
courageously. They both demonstrated a high level of maturity in answering the court's 
questions-:-answeriiig the questions in an articulate, thoughtful, and respectful manner. They are 
both good students with strong academic records. They both expressed a strong desire to 
remain in Utah and bad particular objections to retuming to Mexico. They confirmed that 
they enjoy going to school here, they are involved in chw:ch and several sports activities, 
and they have many friends here. Indeed, both boys became visibly distraught when the 
court discussed the court's task of evaluating whether they should be retumed to Mexico. 
The response ofbotb boys appeared to be purely genuine-not concocted or rehearsed in 
any way. Additionally, the boys were adamant about not wanting to have a supervised visit their 
father while he was in town for the instant court proceedirig. -
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Accordingly, the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the boys are of an 
appropriate age and maturity such that it is appropriate for the court to taJce into account their 
desire to not return to'Mexico. 
If a court detennines, however, that the youngster's opinion is the product of undue 
influence, the child's wishes are not taken into account. Desilva, 481 F.3d at 1286. Here, the 
court recognizes that the boys have spent the past two years solely with their mother and 
maternal grandmother, and that this circumstance has undoubtedly ha<i an impact on their desire 
to stay with their mother in Utah. n is also possible that their mother bas negatively colored the 
boys' view of their father. Here, while the children's objections to returning to Mexico could be 
· due to the mother's possible undue influence over them, the court fmds that this possible undue 
influence is not the only reason the children desire not toretum to Mexico,and thus, the court 
declines to ignore their wishes. The children appear to be genuinely happy and thriving in their .. 
cUITent situation. The coint has attempted to balance this possible undue influence against other 
reasons the boys desire lo stay here and concludes that even though the mother has perltaps 
exerted some undue influence on the boys, the ~curt should still take into account the chilcll'en's 
I 
wishes to remain in Utah and not be returned to Mexico. For this independent reason, the court 
. ' ' 
declines to retwn them to Mexico. 
The court's decision in this case is not based in any way on a belief that the courts cf 
Utah will do a better job than the comts of Mexico City in addressing this unfortunate custody 
situation. To the contrary, the court is certain that the cow1s of Mexico City would be.fully 
capable of handling this litigation. In addition, the court has no doubt that Petitioner genuinely 
wants to see his children and have a relationship with them, and the court hopes such a 
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relationship can develop in the furure. The court, however, is convinced that the return of these 
children to Mexico City at this time and Ullder these circumstances-however wrongfully the 
circ11mstances have arisen-would severely trautnatize these children. The cowt emphasizes that 
this decision bas a limited purpose and effect. It does not mean that Petitioner cannot exercise 
his visitation rights with his children. It merely establishes that the boys will not be returned to 
Mexico but will remain in Utah for any custody proceedings that are initiated here. In light of the 
pending Extradition proceedings against Respondent, however, the funu-e remains wtcertain for 
this family. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Immediate 
Return of Children to Petitioner Purst1ant to the Hague Convention and the International Child 
Abduction Remedies Act is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in 
favor of Respondent. 
DATED this 5111 day of August, 2013, 
BYTIIECOURT: 
United States District Judge 
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Robert C. lunnen 
Commissioner Thomas Patten 
125 North 100 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
October 20, 2014 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Carlie Christensen 
Acting United St,1tes Attorney 
OisrrictofUrah 
185 South Stare Street, #300 
FILED 
OCT20~~ 
4 Tl'1 01SiRJc.1 
srim:oFUTN-, 
trrAHCOUNTY 
Sak lake Cicj, Utah 84111-1506 
Telephone: (801)524-5682 
Fax: (801) 524-6926 
RE: Brooke Robinson aka Susan Consuelo Libbey Aguilera 
Commissioner: 
I am an Assistant United States Attorney in the District of Utah. I represent the United States 
Government regarding the extradition case of Libbey Aguilera referenced above. I understand that 
there is a domestic law hearing scheduled before you this week. Ms. Aguilera is currently incarcerated 
in the Weber County Jail. She was taken into custody pursuant to a federal court order following an 
extradition hearing before United States Magistrate Dustin Pead. Magistrate Pead found that there was 
"probable cause" to allow for the "certification" of her extradition to Mexico. ·she has been charged in 
Mexico with parental kidnapping. In effect, she removed her two minor boys from Mexico to the 
United States in violation of a Mexican family court order requiring her to remain in Mexico, until a 
final ruling was issued by the court. She is currently in federal custody until the State Department 
decides whether to grant Mexico's request for her extradition. 
I believe Magistrate Judge Pead is willing to allow for her temporary release so she may attend 
the domestic hearing. However, I need a few days to obtain the necessary court order. I will petition 
the court today for the court order and will communicate the court's ruling to her domestic attorney 
immediately. If you believe that she should attend the domestic hearing and have the opportunity to 
address the court personally, I will appreciate additional time to seek an order and make arrangements 
for her to attend the hearing. 
Carlie Christensen 
Acting United States Attorney 
Robert C. Lwmen 
Assistant United States Attorney 
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David S. Dolowitz (Utah Bar No. 0899) 
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Shane A. Marx (Utah Bar No. 13293) 
DoLOWITZ HUNNICUTT, PLLC 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Attornf!YS for Respondent 
IN IBE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BROOKE ROBINSON 
(a.k.a. SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEY-
AGUILERA), 
Petitioner, 
V. 
JUAN PABLO MATAS-VIDAL, 
Respondent. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION 
CASE No. 134100249 
JUDGE CHRISTINE JoHNSON 
COMMISSIONER THOMAS PATTON 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on· October 20, 2014, for hearing on the 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Respondent Juan Pablo Matas-Vidal 
("Father") was not present, but was represented by counsel of record, David S. Dolowitz and 
Shane A. Marx of the law firm Dowwrrz HUNNICUTT, PLLC. Petition Brooke Robinson, a.k.a. 
Susan Consuelo Libbey-Aguilera ("Mother"), was not present, but was represented by counsel of 
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record, Don R. Petersen of the law firm How ARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P .C .. Having received the 
parties' pleadings and heard their respective arguments, upon the basis of record herein and for 
good cause otherwise appearing, THE COURT HEREBY FINDS, CONCLUDES, AND 
ORDERS, as follows: 
1. Mother's oral motion to continue the hearing is DENIED. 
2. All motions in domestic cases come before commissioners pursuant to URCP 
101, and the deadlines therein govern the timeliness of the parties' pleadings. Contrary to 
Mother's assertions, the deadlines of URCP 7 do not apply at this stage of proceedings. Father's 
reply was timely filed under URCP 101. Moreover, Mother's absence due to her recent 
incarceration does not warrant a continuance. The issue of jurisdiction is a matter of law, and 
Mother's presence is not necessary for the Court's determination on the matter. 
3. Father's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is GRANTED. 
4. The Court is concerned by the suggestion of the federal court in the proceedings it 
conducted with respect to this family under the Hague Convention and the International Child 
Abduction Remedies Act that "the boys will not be returned to Mexico but will remain in Utah 
for any custody · proceedings initiated here." Matas-Vidal v. Libbey-Aguilera, No. 
2:13CV422DAK, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 110630 at *52 (D. Utah Aug. 5, 2013). 
5. A federal court cannot confer jurisdiction on Utah to conduct child custody 
proceedings and a federal district court judge cannot determine what jurisdiction Utah has or can 
maintain. Only Utah state-court judges can make a binding determination of their own 
jurisdiction. 
2 
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6. Utah's jurisdiction for .custody proceedings is determined by the Utah Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), Utah Code §§ 78B-13-101 et. 
seq. 
7. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the federal court's suggestion that 
this Court has jurisdiction to conduct child custody proceedings, and the federal court's statement 
is that regard is not binding on this Court. This Court's jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEAwas 
not an issue, was not litigated, and was not adjudicated in the proceedings held by federal court. 
The federal court's stated assumption that this Court had jurisdiction is not entitled to any 
deference. 
8. The federal court's ruling is valid except to the extent that it implies this Court has 
jurisdiction to conduct child custody proceedings. 
9. The Court finds that Mexico had jurisdiction in October 2007 when child custody 
proceedings were initiated in the 36th Court of Family Matters in the Federal District of Mexico 
in case number 1427/2007 and- that the subsequent bifurcation in the 24th Court of Family 
Matters in the Federal District of Mexico in case number 1529/2010 further confirmed that 
jurisdiction and reserved the parties custodial rights as subject to further litigation therein in 
November 2010. 
10. Mexico reserved the right to enter additional order regarding the custody of these 
children, and no Mexico court has vacated that order or otherwise unreserved the right to 
conclude custody proceedings there. 
11. The fact that Mother thereafter fled the jurisdiction-even if she. believed she was 
3 
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authorized to do so--does not change the fact that there were pending child custody proceedings 
in Mexico at the time. 
12. Mexico had child custody jurisdiction. It had jurisdiction over both parties, it had 
home-state jurisdiction over the children, and it had jurisdiction of the child custody action 
pending before it. Such jurisdiction is continuing and exclusive in nature. Mexico never gave up 
or abandoned it jurisdiction over its prior orders or the various proceedings that remain pending 
there. 
13. Pursuant to Utah Code§ 78B-13-105(1), "A court of this state shall treat a foreign 
country as a state of the United States for purposes of applying [the UCCJEA]." The Court does 
not find that this case is significantly different than if this was a New York case. If this happened 
in New York and temporary orders were entered there, and then, for whatever reason, one of the 
parents left the State of New York and the courts of New York delayed proceeding on custody 
issues because that party had absconded, but the New York courts otherwise reserved the right to 
enter additional orders and reserved its jurisdiction until the absconding party could be found, 
there is no basis to assume that New York had given up or otherwise abandoned its jurisdiction. 
14. In such a case, the New York court is perfectly within its discretion to delay 
proceedings or enforcement of existing orders until the absconding party reappears before it. The 
fact that the party may have absconded to Utah from New York and stayed here, regardless of 
how long, does not change the continuing and exclusive nature of New York's jurisdiction over 
any child custody proceedings. 
15. Pursuant to Utah Code§ 78B-13-206(1), "a court of this state may not exercise its 
4 
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jurisdiction , . . at the time of the commencement of the proceeding a proceeding concerning the 
custody of the child had been previously commenced in a court of another state having 
jurisdiction substantially in conformity with [the UCCJEA]." If Mother wants to address the 
parties' custodial rights with regard to these children, her remedy is to return to Mexico and 
participate in the child custody proceedings pending there. 
16. If Mother desires to modify the parties existing custodial rights, as articulated in 
the orders from Mexico, she must seek such modification in the courts of Mexico. " [A] court of 
this state may not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state unless 
... neither the child, nor a parent, nor any person acting as a parent presently resides in the other 
state." Utah Code § 78B-13-203(2). Father continues to reside in Mexico, and the courts there 
retain continuing exclusive jurisdiction over modification of their orders. 
17. The Court would certainly never find that judges or commissioners in Utah are 
smarter than judges or commissioners in New York. But that is exactly what Mother is asking 
this Court to do. Mother is asking the Court to declare that because we are dealing with Mexico, 
that the courts there do not have exclusive ongoing jurisdiction. This Court is not willing to rule 
that it is smarter or better than the judges and courts in Mexico, which routinely deal with 
Mexican issues, Mexican children, and a Mexican divorces. It appears to this Court, in every 
way, shape, and form that Mexico has never given up its ongoing exclusive jurisdiction. 
Therefore, this Court must recognize Mexico's ongoing exclusive jurisdiction over custody 
proceedings and orders with respect to these children. 
18. Additionally, criminal charges of Child Trafficking have been pending against 
5 
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Mother in the Thirteenth District Court of Federal Penal Process for the Federal District in case 
number 85/2012, since she fled Mexico with the children. Mother fails to acknowledge that the 
criminal case for Child Trafficking_ is a further exercise and manifestation of Mexico's continuing 
exclusive jurisdiction to conduct custody proceedings under the UCCJEA, and therefore this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain simultaneous proceedings until such criminal charges are 
resolved, pursuant to Utah Code§ 78B-13-206. 
19. If convicted of the pending criminal charges in Mexico, Mother's parental rights 
will be terminated. The UCCJEA defines "child custody proceeding" to include any proceedings 
in which "termination of parental rights" is at issue. Id. § 78B-13-102(4). Furthermore, the 
determination of Mother's legal and physical custody rights over the parties' minor children and 
the extent to which her actions were justified are at the very heart of the Child Trafficking 
criminal case. Under the UCCJEA, these are all child custody determination reached through 
child custody proceedings. See also, In re Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ,r,r 16-17 (defining "custody 
proceeding" under UCCJEA's federal parallel, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, as 
broadly including any proceeding regarding "actual possession and control of a child" or that 
"divests a natural parent of all parental rights, including the rights of custody"). This Court 
cannot exercise its jurisdiction to create a new legal defense for Mother or to otherwise allow her 
to evade the judicial processes in Mexico that she seeks to avoid. Consequently, Utah lacks the 
authority to conduct simultaneous child custody proceedings until-at the very least-Mother's 
Child Trafficking criminal charges are resolved. 
20. Moreover, Mother's actions have eliminated any claim that this situation warrants 
6 
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the exercise of emergency jurisdiction under Utah Code§ 78B-13-204. Under subsection 204(3), 
this Court's exercise of any emergency jurisdiction is limited, and "any order issued by a court of 
this state under this section shall specify in the order a period of time which the cqurt considers 
adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having 
jurisdiction." Further, "[t]he order issued in this state remains in effect until an order is obtained 
from the other state within the period specified or the period expires." Id. § 78B-13-204(3). This 
Court likely would have exercised such jurisdiction to allow Mother to return to Mexico to 
address the orders and proceedings pending there. However, this action was filed on November 
18, 2013. We are now 11 mon{hs down the road, and more than a year past the time when the 
federal court made its order. There no longer exists any basis for the exercise of emergency 
jurisdiction. We are well past that point, and the Court cannot excuse the fact that Mother has not 
returned to the Court of original ongoing jurisdiction and addressed the pending proceedings or 
otherwise obtained a new order there. 
21. Alternatively, even if this Court had a basis to exercise jurisdiction it declines to 
do so as a result of Mother's unjustifiable conduct. Pursuant to Utah Code§ 78B-13-208(1), "if a 
court of this state has jurisdiction under this chapter because a person invoking the jurisdiction 
has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction." It is 
uncontested that Mother fled the territorial jurisdiction of Mexico when proceedings and orders 
were still pending there, and that she has refused to return or otherwise engage in the judicial 
process there. This Court will not condone or otherwise overlook Mother's apparent attempts to 
evade and her unwillingness to engage in the judicial processes in Mexico. Even if there were 
7 
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some arguable basis for jurisdiction herein, the Court will neither exercise emergency nor 
general child custody jurisdiction over these children because Mother has made every effort to 
avoid the jurisdiction of the courts in Mexico, and frustrated the ability of the courts of Mexico 
to conclude the custody proceedings there. In essence, Mother has engaged in unjustifiable 
conduct, and she asks this Court to exercise jurisdiction over issues she has refused to address, 
but that she could have and should have pursued and concluded in Mexico months ago. 
This Order is signed and entered when electronically stamped and dated 
by the Court at the top of the.first page. 
Approved as to form: 
Date: ___________ _ 
Don R. Petersen 
Attorney for Petitioner 
December 05, 2014 09:56 AM 
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RULE 7(0 NOTICE 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, I hereby certify that a true 
and correct copy of the above form of Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction was served on 
November 10, 2014, by the means and to the parties indicated in the following Certificate of 
Service. Notice of objections as to the form of this order must be submitted to the Court and 
counsel within seven (7) days after service. Should no objections to this order be submitted to 
the Court and counsel within seven (7) days after service, this form of order shall be presented to 
the Court for entry and signature. 
/s/ Shane A. Marx 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on November 10, 2014 I caused the foregoing to be served, 
pursuant to UTAH R. Crv. P. 5(b), on the following person(s), by the means indicated herein. 
Don R. Petersen 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
120 E. 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
Tel: (801) 373-6345 
Fax: (801) 377-4991 
Email: petersend@provolawyers.com 
December 05, 2014 09:56 AM 
___ U.S. Regular Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
___ Facsimile Transmission 
___ E-Mail 
--""X,,___ E-Filing 
/s/ Shane A. Marx 
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David S. Dolowitz (Utah Bar No. 0899) 
James M. Hunnicutt (Utah Bar No. 9341) 
Shane A. Marx (Utah Bar No. 13293) 
DoLOWITZ HUNNICUTT, PLLC 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tel: (801) 535-4340 
Fax: (801) 535-4346 
Email: sandy@dolowitzhunicutt.com 
jim@dolowitzhunnicutt.com 
shane@dolowitzhunnicutt.com 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BROOKE ROBINSON 
(a.k.a. SUSAN CONSUELO LIBBEY-
AGUILERA), 
Petitioner, 
V. 
JUAN PABLO MATAS-VIDAL, 
Respondent. 
ORDER OVERRULING PETITIONER'S 
OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATION 
CAsE No. 134100249 
JUDGE CHRISTINE JoHNSON 
COMMISSIONER THOMAS PATTON 
THIS MATTER came before the Honorable Christine Johnson on March 5, 2015 for 
hearing on Petitioner's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation Re: Respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss for Lake of Jurisdiction (Hearing October 20, 2014), filed on November 3, 2014 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 108. Petitioner Brooke Robinson, also known as Susan 
Consuelo Libbey-Aguilera, was present and represented by counsel ofrecord, Don R. Petersen of 
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t~e law firm Howard, Lewis & Petersen, PC. Respondent Juan Pablo Matas-Vidal was not 
present, but was represented by counsel of record, David S. Dolowitz and Shane A. Marx of the 
law firm Dolowitz Hunnicutt, PLLC. Having heard argument, upon the basis of record herein, 
and for good cause·. otherwise appearing, THE COURT HEREBY FINDS, CONCLUDES, 
AND ORDERS THAT: 
1. Petitioner's objection to the Commissioner's recommendation, announced after 
hearing on October· 20, 2014, .and Order of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction, entered ·on 
December 5, 2014, is OVERR_ULED or otherwise DENIED. 
2. · The Commissioner's recommendation contained in the Order of Dismissal for 
Lack of Jurisdiction, entered on December 5, 2014, is accurate and appropriate, and the Court 
hereby adopts the am,1lysis contained therein. 
3. There are both civil and criminal proceedings pending in Mexico wherein the 
custody of the parties' minor children and the parties' parental rights remain at issue. This 
' 
indicates to the Court that Mexico has not abandoned and otherwise continues to exercise 
jurisdiction over issl,les of child custody. Consequently, this Court is without and otherwise 
declines to assert c~ild custody jurisdiction. This determination is informed by the Court's 
reading of the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, Utah Code§§ 78B-
13-101 et seq., the rarental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A, and 
Crump rICrump, 821 P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
4. The ~rifled Petition to Dstablis• Custody of Minor Culdren, Payment of Culd 
2 
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Olpport and Alimony, Ontry of Restraining Order~ and for Attorney Cees, filed on November 18, 
2013 by Petitioner Brooke Robinson, also known as Susan Consuelo Libbey-Aguilera, is hereby 
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 
This Order is signed and entered when electronically stamped and dated by the 
Court at.-the top of the.first page. 
Approved as to form: 
Date: ___________ _ 
Don R. Petersen 
Attorney for Petitioner 
March 17, 2015 01:29 PM 
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RULE 7(0 NOTICE 
Pursuant to Rule 7(±) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, I hereby certify that a true 
and correct copy of the above form of order was served on March 6, o:::r:::q by the means and to 
the parties indicated in the following Certificate of ~r• ce. Notice of objections as to the form 
of this order must be submitted to the Court and counsel within seven (7) days after service. 
Should no objections to this order be submitted to the Court and counsel within seven (7) days 
after service, this form of order shall be presented to the Court for entry and signature. 
/s/ Shane A. Marx 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 6, o:::r:::q I caused the foregoing to be served, 
pursuant to UTAH R. Crv. P. 5(b), on the following person(s), by the means indicated herein. 
Don R. Petersen 
HowARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, PC 
Attorney for Petitioner 
120 E. 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
Tel: (801) 373-6345 
Fax: (801) 377-4991 
Email: petersend@provolawyers.com 
March 17, 2015 01:29 PM 
___ U.S. Regular Mail 
___ Hand Delivery 
___ Facsimile Transmission 
X E-Mail 
X E-Filing 
/s/ Shane A. Marx 
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FILED 
/\PR 3 0 2015_ 
4iHD\SiRA"1!\. 
SiAiE OF \JfAH 
UTAH COUNTY _ 
FOURTH JUDIOAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BROOKE ROBINSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
-JUAN PABLO MATAS-VIDAL, 
Respondent. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO 
AMEND ORDER 
Case No. 134100249 
Date: April 28, 2015 
Judge Christine S. Johnson 
'This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Motion to Amend, filed 
together with a supporting memorandum on March 31, 2015. Respondent filed 
his Opposition on April 14, 2015. There was no reply. Neither party having 
requested a hearing, Respondent submitted the motion for decision on April 22, 
2015. Having reviewed the submissions of the parties, and being advised of the 
applicable rules and the governing law, the Court denies the motion, based 
upon the following: 
The Court entered its Order Overruling Objection to Commissioner's 
Recommendation on March 17, 2015. Petitioner filed her present motion within 
14 days~ as required. Petitioner seeks relief pursuant to Rule 59, which allows 
for an amendment to judgment under specified grounds: to correct irregularity 
in the proceedings, misconduct by the jury, accident or surprise, newly 
Page 1 of 2 
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discovered evidence, excessive or inadequate damages, insufficiency of the 
evidence, or error. See URCP 59(a). Additionally, Petitioner cites to Rule 52, 
which permits the court to "amend its findings or make additional findings and 
may amend the judgment accordingly." URCP 52(b). A decision to alter or 
amend judgment lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. See College 
Irr. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irr. Co., 780 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Utah 1989). 
In Petitioner's memorandum, she devotes significant time to restating 
facts which have been previously presented. She then argues that the Court 
should amend its prior judgment, relying upon prior error as grounds for 
amending judgment under Rule 59. However, the arguments asserted are not 
new and are no more persuasive now then they were when presented initially. 
Because Petitioner's objection to the Commissioner and this Court's decision 
regarding jurisdiction has been fully heard and considered, this Court declines 
to exercise its discretion to amend judgment under Rule 59. 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner's motion to amend judgment is 
DENIED. 
SO ORDERED. _ 
This Ruling shall stand as the Order of the Court. Pursuant to Rule 7, no 
further order is required. 
DATED this 28 day of April, 2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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